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IMPOUNDING POLLUTION CONTROL FUNDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Early in 1974 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida directed the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to make available all funds authorized for appro-
priation by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972.1 Florida v. Train2 was another in a series of cases that have
prompted similar directives.3 The Nixon Administration's refusal to
make those funds available, which gave rise to the litigation, provides
one example of a presidential practice generally characterized as "im-
poundment" of appropriated funds. Stated briefly, impoundment
occurs when a President, for any of a variety of reasons, declines to
release the entirety of an appropriation authorized by Congress.4
This note was set in print prior to the resignation of former President Nixon.
The issues discussed herein, however, remain unaffected by recent political events. Presi-
dent Ford has not intimated any inclination to reverse the Nixon policy regarding the
withholding of water pollution control funds and such a reversal is not likely to occur.
Because of the new President's intention to reduce federal expenditure, see, e.g., A Sick
Economy-What's To Be Done?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., September 9, 1974, at 13, alter-
ation of a policy designed to curtail government spending realistically cannot be ex-
pected-unless the Supreme Court dictates otherwise. Moreover, it appears that, even as
a congressman, President Ford hoped that water pollution control spending could be
held below the congressionally authorized level. See note 174 infra. Therefore, it does not
seem likely that the President will act to moot the water pollution control funding
controversy, which the Supreme Court has agreed to resolve during its 1974 term. See
note 11 infra.
1. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-376 (Supp.
1974)).
2. No. Civ.-T.D.-73-156 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-1790, 5th
Cir., April 3, 1974.
3. See, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974); Texas v. Fri, Civil Action No. A-73-CA-38 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 1973), ap-
peal docketed, Nos. 73-3965, 73-4026, 5th Cir., Jan. 9, 1974; Minnesota v. EPA, No. A-73
Civ. 133 (D. Minn. June 25, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1446, 8th Cir., July 12, 1973.
But see Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va.), remand-
ed with directions sub nom. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D.
Cal. 1973).
4. There is no precise and generally accepted definition of the term "impound-
ment." See Levinson & Mills, Impoundment: A Search for Legal Principles, 26 U. FLA.
L. REv. 191-93 (1973); Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1505 n.l (1973);
Note, Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 YAuz
L.J. 1636 n.2 (1973). As used throughout this note, however, "impoundment" will refer
to any unilateral presidential decision to withhold any portion of funds made available
for expenditure by Congress.
It is important to recognize that impoundment can be accomplished in a variety
of ways; a simple presidential directive to halt the release of particular federal revenues
has not always been at issue. The same result can be attained, for example, by refusing
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Sometimes compelling justifications may exist for the President's uni-
lateral action.3 At other times, however, it may appear that the Presi-
dent intends to frustrate the realization of a congressionally enacted
program that he considers unnecessary or uncomplementary to his own
policies and priorities.
The latter situation has occurred with unprecedented frequency
during the incumbency of President Nixon,8 and is exemplified by
his impoundment of over half the sums authorized for appropriation
by the pollution control act amendments. In October 1972 Congress
approved the appropriation of 11 billion dollars for the construction
of water treatment plants during fiscal years 1973 and 1974.7 The
President vetoed that bill because of its "staggering, budget-wrecking"
price tag,8 but Congress subsequently overrode his veto by a wide
margin. 9 Despite the override, the President directed the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to make available for
expenditure only 5 billion of the 11 billion dollars authorized for ap-
propriation.10
Litigation that has resulted from the President's directive provides
an instructive overview of the approach the judiciary has adopted in
resolving impoundment disputes. Moreover, the Administration's with-
holding of pollution control funds will prompt the first United States
to review applications for participation in certain federal programs, see, e.g., National
Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897
(D.D.C. 1973) (construction and staffing of mental health centers), or by rechanelling feder-
al funds that Congress has designated for one program into another, see, e.g., Sioux Valley
Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686 (D.S.D. 1973) (rural electrification loans).
Furthermore, impoundment does not always mean that particular federal revenues
are irrevocably frozen; the President might only "suspend" operation of a statutory
program, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, No. 73-1835
(D.C. Cir. July 19, 1974) (low-income housing programs), or retard the rate at which
federal funds will be made available so that the level of funding designated for expendi-
ture by Congress during a particular fiscal year ultimately might not be available. This
latter situation is best exemplified by the President's refusal to make available to the
states all authorized water pollution control funding. The President initially cut the
congressional authorization by one-half, see note 10 and accompanying text infra, and Ad-
ministration spokesmen now argue that additional sums will be available only when
and if, in the Administration's view, the need is deemed to exist. See note 144 infra.
5. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text infra.
6. See discussion at pp. 560-69 infra.
7. 118 CONG. REc. S 16,895 (daily ed. October 4, 1972).
8. Id. at S 18,534 (daily ed. October 17, 1972).
9. The vote to override was 52-12 in the Senate, id. at S 18,546, S 18,554 (daily ed.
October 17, 1972). and 247-23 in the House, id. at H 10,266, H 10,273 (daily ed. October
18, 1972).
10. 30 CONG. Q. (Weekly Rep.) at 3083 (1972). More recently the Administration
announced that it would make available only $4 billion of the $7 billion authorized for
fiscal year 1975. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1974, at I, col. 5. Therefore the Administration
has effectively impounded exactly one-half of the total $18 billion authorized.
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Supreme Court pronouncement on the impoundment issue.1 The
resolution of the pollution control act controversy will be particularly
significant for the state of Florida: only seven states stand to lose more
federal aid during fiscal 1975 if the President's policy is sustained by
the Supreme Court.12 This note will focus specifically on the con-
siderations that should prove determinative of the Court's decision and
will offer a commentary on the issue of impoundment generally.
II. THE NIXON EXPERIENCE: IMPOUNDMENT To EFFECTUATE
POLICY
As the Nixon Administration contends, the practice of impound-
ment enjoys considerable historical heritage. 13 Almost without excep-
tion, however, previous administrations have impounded appropriated
funds only where military spending was affected or wartime emergency
measures were involved,14 or where Congress had expressed its ap-
proval of the President's action.15  Thus, past impoundments
arguably could be justified as an exercise of the President's responsi-
bilities as "Commander-in-Chief" under article II, section 2,16 or as
the effectuation of a policy sanctioned by both the executive and legis-
lative branches of government.
An important alteration in this historical pattern has evolved during
the tenure of President Nixon. The Nixon Administration has not im-
pounded funds to reshape the military budget, nor has it sought con-
gressional approval when the withholding of appropriated funds is
contemplated. Rather, the Administration has impounded funds in
a manner designed to impose its own economic and political
11. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to City of New York v. Train, 494
F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492
(4th Cir. 1973). 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974). These cases are discussed at pp. 585-95 infra.
12. Florida was to be allotted $72.5 million for fiscal year 1973, $108.8 million for
fiscal year 1974 and $164.5 million for fiscal year 1975. See Brief for Appellant at Sa-4a,
Florida v. Train, appeal docketed, No. 74-1790, 5th Cir., April 3, 1974.
13. See, e.g., Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 AD. Sos. Q. 561, 363-70
(1970); Miller, Presidential Power To Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in
Constitutional Decision-Making, 43 N.C.L. REv. 502, 512-12 (1965); Stanton, History and
Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53 NEB. L. REv. 1, 3-14
(1974); Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1507-12 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Davis, Congressional Power To Require Defense Expenditures, 33 FonD.
L. REv. 39 (1964); Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BuFr7,AwO L. REv.
141, 158-64 (1973); Miller, supra note 13, at 521-22; Stassen, Separation of Powers and
the Uncommon Defense: The Case Against Impounding of Weapons System Appropria-
tions, 57 GEo. L.J. 1159, 1177-78 (1969).
15. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 363-64, 369-73; Fisher, Funds Impounded by the
President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 124-25 (1969).
16. But see note 42 infra.
IMPOUNDMENT
philosophy on congressionally established policies and programs, 7 and
to substitute its priorities for those of Congress.' While a variety of.
justifications have been offered for the withholding of funds, 9 one
fact remains clear: legislative programs disdained by the President
have suffered, while programs held in presidential esteem have re-
ceived adequate financial support.
Even a cursory review of recent executive budgetary decisions
confirms this conclusion. During the early days of its tenure, for
example, the Nixon Administration withheld funding intended for
research health grants, Model Cities and urban renewal as part of its
plan to control inflation through a reduction in government expendi-
tures.20 But, at the same time, the Administration supported such cost-
ly projects as the supersonic transport, a landing on Mars and a new
manned bomber.21 The Administration maintains that comparative.
effectiveness, the choice between "good" and "better," controls its
determination to support certain programs while withholding ap-
propriated funds from others.22 Aside from the question of whether
the President, rather than Congress, should make that determination,
the very fact that the SST received the President's blessing suggests
that politics weighs more heavily in the balance than does program
effectiveness.23
A similar conclusion can be derived from a statistical analysis of
Administration spending priorities. A large proportion of the Presi-
dent's yearly budget is "uncontrollable"; that is, certain funds are
previously obligated to such programs as social security, Medicare and
veterans' benefits. 4 Approximately 75 percent of the 1974 fiscal year
17. See L. FISHR, PRESmIENT AND CONGRESS: PowER AND POLICY 125 (1972).
18. More specifically, the Nixon Administration sacrificed a variety of congressionally
enacted domestic programs in pursuit of its policy of curtailing inflation through budget
reductions. Statutory programs in the areas of housing, agriculture, education, health,
water pollution control and the former Office of Economic Opportunity have suffered most
heavily. For a summary of litigation concerning funds impounded in each of these
areas, see Fisher, Court Cases On Impoundment of Funds: A Summary and Analysis,
Aug. 22, 1973 (Congressional Research Service).
19. See notes 42-51 and accompanying text infra.
20. Fisher, supra note 13, at 372.
21. Id.
22. See Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment
of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 278 (1973)
(testimony of R.L. Ash, Director-designate, OMB) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
23. Many authorities scorned the wastefulness of efforts to develop the SST, which
was characterized as an "aerial Edsel." See Aerospace: The Troubled Blue Yonder, TIME,
April 5, 1971, at 76.
24. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 372; Pine, The Impoundment Dilemma: Crisis in
Constitutional Government, 3 YALE REV. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 99, 118 (1973); Hearings
on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on Separation
1974]
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budget, for example, was "uncontrollable." 25 This means that only
25 percent of the projected budget was amenable to alteration by the
President or Congress. Military-related expenditures constitute the
greatest portion of "controllables," yet a study of the 1971 budget
revealed that, while the Department of Defense received 76 percent of
total controllable funds, only 10.5 percent of all presidential impound-
ments affected military appropriations.26
The Administration's intent to use impoundment as a means of
establishing its own spending priorities also can be inferred from the
President's active campaign against the passage of legislation empower-
ing him to control expenditures through across-the-board cuts in ap-
propriations. After the Senate adopted the "Jordan Amendment,"
authorizing the President to withhold funding on an equal basis from
all programs, domestic and military, the Administration fought the
proposal in the House and ultimately secured its defeat.27 The
lobbying efforts undertaken by the Administration suggest that the
President prefers to control spending only if he can select the particular
programs to be affected. 28
Critics of Administration policy 29 tend to focus their attention on
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), where decisions to im-
pound certain appropriations are finalized. Although OMB (formerly
the Bureau of the Budget) originally was established to assist Congress,
the operation of that department has evolved into an effective means
of implementing presidential policy.30 Through the use of selective
impoundments the Nixon Administration has enabled OMB to per-
form a major role in the establishment of national priorities. Although
Budget Director Ash contends that the President's budget is intended
only as a proposal, offered for congressional consideration,31 there is
evidence to suggest that much of the proposal is considered final. Data
collected by one commentator 2 indicate that when Congress appro-
priates more than the presidential budget has allocated to a particular
program, the congressional "add-on" simply may be withheld by
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess 139-40 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
25. Fisher, Presidential Impoundment of Funds, in 1971 Hearings 595.
26. Id. See also 1973 Hearings 535 (remarks of Senator Muskie).
27. See 1973 Hearings 257, 276 (remarks of Senator Ervin).
28. Secretary of Agriculture Butz, however, argues that across-the-board cuts are
the "cowardly way" to reduce federal spending. See 1973 Hearings 535.
29. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings 481-91 (remarks of Senator Muskie).
30. See A. WILDAVSKY, THE PouTIcs OF THE BuncETARY PROCESS 181-92 (1964); Pine,
supra note 24, at 101-02. See also 1973 Hearings 485-90.
31. See 1973 Hearings 285 (testimony of R.L. Ash, Director-designate, OMB).
32. The following table is taken from Glass, Impoundment Policy Fuels Political
Struggle With Congress, 3 NAT'L J. 1027 (1971):
IMPOUNDMENT
OMB.33 Moreover, the Administration apparently believes that when
the President's budget message proposes the termination of a con-
gressionally enacted program, the administrator responsible for that
program should act accordingly and, even before Congress approves
or disapproves, begin to "phase out" program activities through the
withholding of appropriated funds.3 4 Since the budget message con-
stitutes a declaration of presidential priorities, the withholding of
appropriated funds to bring congressional spending preferences in line
with that message can accurately be characterized as the use of im-
poundment to effect presidential policy that Congress specifically has
rejected.
Defenders of the Administration argue that the President has no
choice but to impound appropriated funds, in view of the congression-
IMPOUNDMENTS IN URBAN SEcroR
This table lists impoundments of major housing and transit programs for fiscal
1971. Program backlog is the total demand for funds for approved programs and
does not include pending applications. Unmet demand is the difference be-
tween program backlog and the Nixon Administration's spending plans. In
most cases, the Nixon budget and the funds withheld add up to the appropriation.
In the case of model cities, however, the Administration now plans to spend more
than the $375 million it budgeted; thus, the budget figure and the amount with-
held fall short of the appropriation. All figures are in millions of dollars.
appro- Nixon with- program unmet
priated budget held backlog demand
Urban renewal $1,200 $1,000 $ 200 $2,756 $1,756
Model cities 1,107 375 583 0 a
Water and sewer 350 150 200 2,500# 2,350
Public housing 320 128 192 560 432
Mass transit 600 269t 200 1,000 t  731t
Total $3,577 $1,922 $1,375 $6,816t $5.269t
*-Approximately 50 per cent of initial applications and 30 per cent of initial pro-
gram budgets were approved for model cities program. Few, if any, addi-
tional cities are to be designated under pending fiscal 1972 budget.
*-$465 million of the total backlog is listed as active backlog for fiscal 1971.
:-Excluding model cities.
t-Capital grants only. The total Administration budget for mass transit is $400
million.
SOURCE: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
33. This conclusion is reinforced by the Administration's treatment of Congress'
fiscal year 1971 appropriation for the Rural Electrification Administration. Although
the budget request for that program amounted to $322 million, Congress appropriated
$337 million. The President thereupon impounded the additional $15 million. See Arnold
& Porter, Memorandum to National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, in 1973
Hearings 594, 628.
34. See Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 70-76 (D.D.C.
1973).
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al proclivity to enact swollen appropriations bills.35 Several congressmen
themselves have suggested that only the President can retard the fiscal
irresponsibility of Congress. 36 The wisdom of certain impoundments
hardly can be faulted;3 7 for example, the President's withholding of
funds earmarked for the construction of a National Aquarium in
Washington, D.C., precluded what seemed to be a nonessential infusion
of 10 million dollars into an inflationary economy.3 8 Had Congress
been left to its own devices, the money apparently would have been
spent.
Regardless of whether the President has in some instances "proper-
ly" impounded appropriated funds, however, the fact remains that
Congress' right to legislate has been seriously eroded. When the Presi-
dent vetoes an appropriations bill passed by Congress and that veto
ultimately is overridden, the matter, theoretically, is ended. But the
Nixon Administration has added an additional step to the process-
the subsequent impoundment of funds appropriated over the Presi-
dent's veto. The President's use of impoundment to ensure that
Congress will not contravene his spending policies creates serious im-
plications for the separation of powers concept inherent in American
government. It is the function of individual congressmen to respond to
the needs of their respective constituencies through the initiation of
appropriate legislation. Such efforts will become irrelevant if the
President can, at will, refuse to release funds appropriated to imple-
ment that legislation. 9 The withholding of appropriated funds by the
Nixon Administration to effectuate its policies has added a new dimen-
sion to the historical impoundment controversy: the struggle now is
reduced to the question of which governmental branch-Congress or
the President-enjoys ultimate authority to establish national priori-
ties.4
0
35. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings 369 (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
36. The late Senator Long, of Louisiana, once remarked: " 'If we can't restrain our-
selves from spending $30 billion more than we are taking in . . . then we shouldn't
complain about a fellow who refuses to bankrupt the country.' " 1973 Hearings 867
(statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General), quoting from The Washington
Post, January 26, 1973, at A2.
37. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text infra.
38. This particular episode is discussed in more detail in 1971 Hearings 139-41.
39. But see 1973 Hearings 837 (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General):
"Protests of 'usurpation' are being voiced by some in the current debate. Surely such
protests are hyperbole. The modest power not to spend money is not the power of a
man on horseback."
40. This is not to suggest, of course, that the President is not accorded a constitu-
tional role in the establishment of national spending priorities. He clearly does share a
role in that process, through the recommending of legislation and the exercise of his
veto authority. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7. But the inclusion in the Constitution of
authority to override a presidential veto, id., suggests that Congress enjoys the last word.
IMPOUNDMENT
President Nixon has argued that his constitutional right to im-
pound appropriated funds is "absolutely clear." 41 More precisely, Ad-
ministration spokesmen have defended on three particular bases the
President's refusal to release the entirety of certain appropriations.
First, those spokesmen contend that certain article II executive powers
provide the President with considerable latitude to control the rate
at which appropriated funds are obligated.4 2 Few courts have con-
41. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1973, at 20, col. 1. The President was discussing his
right to impound "when the spending of money would mean either increasing prices
or increasing taxes for all the people ... , " id; it is not clear whether the President
was asserting a constitutional right generally, or only in those more limited cir-
cumstances.
42. More specifically, Administration spokesmen cite the presidential obligation to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed," mandated by art. II, § 3. Although
critics have assailed the "anomalous proposition" that the duty to execute the laws
includes the right to withhold appropriated funds, see Rehnquist, Presidential Authority
To Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally Impacted Schools, in 1973
Hearings 390, 393; 1973 Hearings 373, 382 (remarks of Senator Ervin), the Administra-
tion contends that its position is dictated by two closely related propositions. First, it is
argued that the President must operate within the framework of frequently conflicting
federal statutes. For example, the Antideficiency Act and the federal debt ceiling, see
notes 44 & 47 infra, may require the reservation of funds authorized for expenditure by
a particular appropriations act. See 1973 Hearings 278 (statement of R.L. Ash, Director-
designate, OMB). When such conflicts arise, the President must decide either to partially
contravene the appropriations act or to ignore those statutes designed to limit federal
expenditures: "[The President] has a duty to execute all the laws . .. and sometimes
he has to harmonize them in ways that will not permit the accomplishment fully of
each." Id. at 382 (testimony of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General). Secondly, the
Administration finds in article II a delegation to the President of general managerial
authority to ensure that the laws are implemented economically. Deputy Attorney
General Sneed has reasoned that the President's obligation to faithfully execute the
laws "plainly includes an obligation to prevent waste." Id. at 360. If Sneed's contention is
correct, the Administration apparently enjoys considerable latitude to exercise value
judgments with respect to specific programs, since a determination of "wasteful" ex-
penditure obviously will approximate one's personal evaluation of substantive merit.
Although the specific issue has not arisen within the context of recent impoundment
decisions, but cf. National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Wein-
berger, 361 F. Supp. 897, 901 (D.D.C. 1973), Administration spokesmen have argued that
the President enjoys "substantial" constitutional authority to control spending in the
areas of national defense and foreign relations. See 1973 Hearings 368 (statement of
J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General); 1971 Hearings 95 (statement of C.W. Weinberger,
Director, OMB). This authority allegedly arises from the President's article II role as
Commander-in-Chief, and from the recognition of presidential hegemony over foreign
affairs implicit in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
There is historical precedent to support the Administration's position; the Commander-
in-Chief clause has been invoked previously to justify both the wartime impoundment
of public works funds and the peacetime impoundment of weapons systems appropria-
tions. See, e.g., Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 141,
158-64 (1973). But the constitutional delegation of article II Commander-in-Chief
authority must be balanced against the delegation to Congress of authority to declare
war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to establish rules
for the regulation of both land and naval forces. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In short, the
1974]
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fronted this argument; it has not been persuasive, however, to those
that have considered it.43 Secondly, the Administration argues that in
plain language of the Constitution suggests that, aside from strategic and tactical decision-
making, Congress shares "wartime authority" with the President.
Moreover, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra, is of questionable relevance
to the issue of impounded funds, even when those funds are destined for international
obligation. The Court in Curtiss-Wright did repeat with approval a characterization
of the President as "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations." 299 U.S.
at 319. But the presidential proclamation challenged and sustained in that case had
been expressly authorized by Congress. Id. at 312. Similar legislative-executive agree-
ment is absent when Congress authorizes the expenditure of certain funds, and those
funds subsequently are withheld by the President.
Finally, the legal scope of Commander-in-Chief or "sole organ" impoundment
authority probably will remain an academic issue in the foreseeable future. The Nixon
Administration has not attempted to justify its withholding of funds from domestic
programs on the basis of a "wartime emergency." And in view of current executive support
of the development of a "modern defense capability," a significant withholding of funds
from the Department of Defense is not likely to eventuate. Cf. notes 24-26 and accompany-
ing text supra.
43. In Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
No. 75-1835 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 1974), the court was effectively confronted with the
Administration's postulation of an article II executive responsibility to prevent wasteful
expenditures. See note 42 supra. Pursuant to the President's determination that certain
Housing and Urban Development Act programs had "failed," Secretary Lynn, relying upon
the "powers granted to the Executive by article II of the Constitution," suspended pro-
gram funding. 362 F. Supp. at 1372. The court, however, summarily dismissed the Secre-
tary's constitutional analysis:
It is certainly true that [article II] powers have long been interpreted as broad
grants of authority necessary to the fulfillment of the many and varied duties
imposed upon the President and the Executive Branch. It is not true that the
Executive has the authority to terminate . . . a statutory program such as that
involved here . .. It is not within the discretion of the Executive to refuse to
execute laws passed by Congress but with which the Executive presently disagrees.
Id. Similarly, in Massachusetts v. Weinberger, Civil Action No. 1308-73 (D.D.C. July 26,
1975), reprinted at 119 CONG. REC. S 15,044 (daily ed. July 30, 1973), the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare defended his refusal to release funds appropriated under
the National Defense Education Act partially on the basis of alleged article II executive
power "to control overall federal spending." Id. at S 15,045. The court was unimpressed
by that rationale and, while conceding that the control of spending was "an entirely
laudable objective," nevertheless concluded that no such article 11 power exists: "Cer-
tainly the President's duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed cannot include
the power defendants are claiming." Id.
In Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1975),
former Director Phillips maintained that his termination of certain OEO activities was
justifiable in view of the President's decision to request no additional program funds
for the following fiscal year. The court responded that Phillips really argued "that the
Constitution confers the discretionary power upon the President to refuse to execute
laws passed by Congress with which he disagrees." Id. at 77. The court then turned to
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), for the proposition that, were
the article U1 "faithfully execute" clause interpreted to sanction the withholding of funds
mandated for expenditure by Congress, it "would be clothing the President with a
power entirely to control the legislation of Congress, and paralyze the administration
of justice." 358 F. Supp. at 77, quoting from 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613. Were the position of
the defendant sustained, the court reasoned, "no barrier would remain to the executive
IMPOUNDMENT
many instances a variety of federal statutes require the President to
withhold substantial portions of a particular appropriation. Prominent
among these are the Antideficiency Act of 1950 (ADA),44 the Employ-
ment Act of 1946, 4 the Economic Stabilization Act of 197040 and the
ignoring any and all Congressional authorizations if he deemed them . . . contrary to
the needs of the nation." 358 F. Supp. at 77.
44. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970). The ADA authorized the Bureau of the Budget, now
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to "provide for contingencies, or to effect
savings whenever savings are made possible by or through changes in requirements,
greater efficiency of operations, or other developments subsequent to the date on which
[an] appropriation was made available." 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2). C.W. Weinberger, Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare, has characterized the ADA as perhaps "the most
explicit authority" for presidential impoundment of appropriated funds. See 1971 Hear-
ings 95. Obviously, the statutory language quoted is amenable to broad interpretation,
and the Administration has found considerable latitude in the reference to "other de-
velopments." For example, Budget Director Ash has argued that the failure of a con-
gressionally enacted program to achieve its original objectives, in the Administration's
opinion, is a "dramatic other development" necessitating that funds be withheld from
that program. See 1973 Hearings 287.
As critics of impoundment urge, however, see, e.g., 1973 Hearings 283-84 (remarks
of Senator Ervin), the ADA was intended to preclude executive expenditure beyond
the levels authorized by Congress, and to prevent the development of year-end deficiencies
historically caused by over-expenditure at the beginning of a particular year. See FsHER,
PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING PowER, excerpted in 1973 Hearings 396-99, discussing history and
purposes of the ADA. Moreover, the Budget Bureau Examiner's Handbook for 1952 ad-
monishes that funds must not be reserved pursuant to the ADA "to nullify the intent
of Congress with respect to specific projects or levels of programs." Id. at 399. And
finally, the Act provides that if the Director of OMB determines that certain reservations
"will not be required to carry out the purposes of the appropriation concerned," he can
recommend the rescission of that portion of the appropriation. See 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2)
(1970). It is therefore apparent that the framers of the Act did not contemplate unilateral
action by the President, but rather intended that Congress have the final word.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1026 (Supp. 1974). Exactly how this
legislation confers impoundment authority has not been made clear. The preamble to
the Act is couched in the broadest possible language, declaring it the "continuing policy
and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to pro-
mote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power." The body of the Act
then creates the Council of Economic Advisers and requires the President to produce
an annual report on the economy. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1022-25 (1970). The President's
responsibility is limited to offering recommendations for legislation that he deems
desirable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(4) (1970). Asked to explain what provision of the
Act confers impoundment authority on the President, OMB Director Ash could only
respond: "The net effect of it is to maintain a sound economy and responsible fiscal
actions of the Government." 1973 Hearings 283.
46. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85
Stat. 743 (1971). Neither the Act nor its 1971 amendments appear to support the Presi-
dent's claim of statutory authority to impound appropriated funds. Although the
amendments do provide the President with a variety of policy tools, including wage
and price controls, his power is specifically defined and no reference is made to impound-
ment. See Pub. L. No. 92-210, §§ 207(b)-(c), 85 Stat. 747 (1971). Moreover, in apparent
response to the President's assertion, § 4 of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat. 27, dictates that the Act shall not be construed
to authorize or require the impoundment of appropriated funds.
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public debt ceiling.41 Of these statutes only the ADA has received
significant judicial attention, but no court has found it a determinative
consideration. 48
Finally, the Administration looks to appropriations acts themselves
for support; but here its position has been ambivalent. Initially it was
argued that the Constitution prohibits Congress from mandating the
expenditure of appropriated funds. Federal spending, the President's
defenders contended, is a constitutional responsibility shared by both
the executive and legislative branches of government.49 More recently
the Administration apparently has conceded that Congress can require
the release of appropriations. 0 Thus the Administration's defense of
impoundment has focused on the allegedly discretionary nature of
funding obligations imposed by particular acts or statutes.
51
47. 31 U.S.C.A. § 757(b) (Supp. 1973). The Administration contends that when
Congress appropriates funds which, if obligated, would necessitate government borrowing
beyond the limit established by law, the President has no choice but to impound those
funds. See 1973 Hearings 366 (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General). There
is reason to believe, however, that the President would encounter no difficulty in securing
at least a temporary increase in the debt ceiling should the expenditure of appropriated
funds so require. Budget Director Ash concedes that the Administration has indeed re-
quested such an increase on several occasions. See 1973 Hearings 291. Since Congress
generally has responded to a demonstrated need to raise the debt ceiling, see Note, Im-
poundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1522 (1973), it seems fair to conclude that
the debt ceiling itself does not "require" the withholding of appropriated funds.
48. In State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973) (im-
poundment of Federal-Aid Highway Act funds), the court reasoned that a total or sub-
stantial cut in the funding of a particular program constitutes more than an effectua-
tion of "savings," as prescribed by the ADA. The court observed that
reserves may only be established when the funds "will not be required to carry
out the purposes of the appropriation concerned .... " [The] power to withhold
funds cannot be used if it would jeopardize the policy of the statute.
Id. at 1118. The court added that the question of whether a particular "other develop-
ment" may justify the withholding of funds, see note 44 supra, must be viewed "in the
context of not violating the purposes and objectives of the particular appropriation
statute." Id; accord, Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686, 697
(D.S.D. 1973). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning suggests that the Administration's refusal
to allot 55% of funds authorized for appropriation by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, see notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra, could
not be supported by the ADA. But see Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d
492, 501 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
49. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text infra.
50. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra.
51. A judicial conclusion that a particular act or statute does not mandate ex-
penditure, however, is not dispositive of the impoundment issue. The court then must
determine whether the executive may consider factors other than those enumerated in
the statute, such as the rate of inflation, in controlling the rate of spending. This latter
inquiry is significant; obviously, if the President's spending discretion is circumscribed
by factors enumerated in the statute he is less able to use impoundment arbitrarily or
as a means of substituting his own policies and priorities for those of Congress. Most
courts have agreed that the President's spending discretion is limited by the specifics of
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Numerous commentators already have analyzed and dissected the
Administration's defense of impoundment2 and this note will not
undertake a similar general inquiry. Moreover, speculation concern-
ing the President's constitutional ability to impound appropriated
funds is largely a fruitless endeavor: no court has been, nor likely will
be, called upon to decide whether "impoundment" per se is legal.53
Instead, impoundment litigation has turned on the language and his-
tory of the appropriations legislation involved. Therefore, this note
will address only the third of the asserted justifications for impound-
ment-relating to the nature of appropriations acts-and will devote
particular attention to impoundment cases concerning the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.54 Several pro-
cedural obstacles to judicial review of impoundment disputes then will
be considered and, finally, a recent legislative response to the issue will
be briefly examined.
III. THE NATURE OF AN APPROPRIATION: A MANDATE To SPEND?
The Administration's argument that it is not required to commit
all funds authorized for expenditure by Congress proceeds on the
premise that appropriations acts in general permit, but do not require,
the release of those funds. Whether this premise is derived from the
language of the Constitution or merely from historical precedent re-
mains unclear. Article I, section 9, of the Constitution states in part:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law ... ." In the opinion of OMB Direc-
tor Ash, this language conclusively establishes Congress' inability to
compel the expenditure of funds: "No money is drawn from the
treasury that is not duly appropriated, but that does not [mean]
all money actually appropriated must be drawn from the Treasury." 55
the disputed legislation. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099,
1114 (8th Cir. 1973) ("We find nothing within these provisions of the Act which
explicitly or impliedly allows the Secretary to withhold approval of construction projects
for reasons remote and unrelated to the Act"); Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Butz,
367 F. Supp. 686, 697 (D.S.D. 1973) (legislation in question did not delegate to the
President "the power to reassess and reorder Congressional priorities in an attempt to
effect Executive economic policies"); Minnesota v. EPA, No. 4-73 Civ. 133 (D. Minn.
July 12, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1446, 8th Cir., July 12, 1973 ("[Nowhere in the
statute does Congress provide that the Administrator may consider matters such as the
shape of the national economy in carrying out this program.').
52. See, e.g., sources cited in notes 4, 13-15 supra.
53. The constitutional issue will almost certainly be avoided since an adequate
alternative basis for decision-statutory construction-is available. See note 179 infra.
54. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-376
(Supp. 1974)).
55. 1973 Hearings 282 (testimony of R.L. Ash, Director-designate, OMB).
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Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Casper Weinberger also
has endorsed this view, reasoning that the "essentially negative
character" of article I, section 9, logically reinforces the Administra-
tion's contention that a law appropriating funds is merely permissive
in nature.56 In support of its argument the Administration cites re-
marks of two former Presidents5 7 a former Attorney General58 and a
House Appropriations Committee.5 9 Each of these authorities has con-
cluded that an appropriations act does not require the full expenditure
of authorized funds, a conclusion that Secretary Weinberger finds
similarly recognized by Congress in the Antideficiency Act.60 More-
over, several federal court decisions have been invoked to demonstrate
that the Administration's position has been sanctioned by the
judiciary.,"
Sources apart from the Administration also have embraced the
view that Congress cannot coerce the President to release all appropriat-
ed funds. Several congressmen have suggested that the appropriations
power is circumscribed by presidential authority.62 Professor Corwin
56. 1971 Hearings 94 (statement of C.W. Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB).
57. President Truman, then Senator, once observed: "When the Congress appropriates
funds it gives the Executive Branch an authority to incur obligations. Certainly none
of us hold that we give a mandate to expend the funds appropriated." 1971 Hearings 94,
quoting from 89 CONG. REC. 10,362 (1943) (statement of C.W. Weinberger, Deputy
Director, OMB).
President Roosevelt is reported to have said: "[T]he mere fact that Congress, by the
appropriation process, has made available specified sums for the various programs and
functions of the Government is not a mandate that such funds must be fully expended."
1971 Hearings 94.
58. 1971 Hearings 94 (statement of C.W. Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB).
59. "Appropriation of a given amount for a particular activity constitutes only a
ceiling upon the amount which should be expended for that activity." Id., quoting from
H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
60. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970). For a discussion of the intent and purposes of the
Act, see note 44 supra.
61. See McKay v. Central Elec. Power Coop., 223 F.2d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Lovett v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 557, 583 (1945), affd on other grounds, 328 US. 303
(1946); Campagna v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 316, 317 (1891); Hukill v. United States,
16 Ct. Cl. 562, 565 (1880). While these decisions might appear relevant to the impound-
ment controversy, each is factually distinguishable on closer examination. See Ramsey,
Impoundment by the Executive Department of Funds Which Congress Has Authorized It
To Spend or Obligate, in 1971 Hearings 291; Pine, supra note 24, at 104-05. None of
the courts that recently have entertained impoundment suits has found these decisions
persuasive.
62. Then-Congressman Laird once remarked: "The Congress cannot compel the
President of the United States to spend money that he does not want to spend." 114
CONG. REc. 30,588-89 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1968). Without adding specifics, Congressman
Flood has referred to the "many instances" in which the President's constitutional power
to withhold appropriations has been made clear. Id. at 30,588. See also 114 CONG. REc.
29,159 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1968) (remarks of Senator Dominick). However, William
Rehnquist, as Assistant Attorney General, has concluded that the "nature or precise
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has characterized federal expenditure as "primarily an executive func-
tion," and has concluded that Congress' role in the appropriations
process is "simply [one] of setting bounds to executive discretion." '
Corwin's opinion, however, seems to include an inherent contradiction.
If Congress can "set bounds" to executive discretion it should follow
that a minimum, as well as maximum, spending level can be designat-
ed-which, of course, is the functional equivalent of mandating a
particular level of expenditure. In other words, if Congress is constitu-
tionally required to allow for presidential spending discretion, it could
simply designate its desired spending level as the minimum amount
that might be spent, while providing presidential discretion to spend
more, up to a given ceiling.
The alternative interpretation of Corwin's position-that Congress
can set only an upper limit, or ceiling, on presidential spending dis-
cretion-has been proposed frequently by presidential spokesmen.6 4
The logic of this interpretation, however, is difficult to defend; it
suggests that while Congress may limit the amount a President may
spend, he is nonetheless free to spend as little as he might please. Such
a proposition surely is inconsistent with constitutional intent: it would
accord the President authority to "veto" any legislative program
Congress might enact, simply by withholding sufficient funding to ob-
struct its implementation.65 It is inconceivable that the framers of
the Constitution intended article I, section 9, to provide presidential
discretion to abrogate the will of Congress-particularly when a care-
fully circumscribed veto power was conferred on the President in
article I, section 7.
Finding logical infirmity in the view that Congress cannot compel
source of authority" for these congressional observations is open to question. See Rehn-
quist, Presidential Authority To Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to
Federally Impacted Schools, in 1973 Hearings 390, 393.
63. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 at 127-28 (4th rev.
ed. 1957). Corwin does concede that Congress may "stipulate any terms it chooses as the
condition of making an appropriation and thereby limit the effective scope of the in-
herently executive prerogative of planning and directing expenditure." Id. at 129. Corwin
apparently viewed Congress' predominant role in the appropriations process as one of
providing restraint to excessive federal expenditure.
64. Secretary Weinberger, for example, has relied upon a House Appropriations
Committee Report for the proposition that "[a]ppropriation of a given amount for a
particular activity constitutes only a ceiling upon the amount which should be expended
for that activity." 1971 Hearings 94, quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951).
65. Several commentators have recognized the similarity between impoundment and
the exercise of an extra-constitutional "item" veto. See 1973 Hearings 400 (remarks of
Mr. Kurland, Chief Consultant, Subcomm. on Separation of Powers); 1971 Hearings 3
(statement of Senator Ervin); Miller, supra note 13, at 512; Comment, Presidential Im-
pounding of Funds: The Judicial Response, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 328, 330-31 (1973).
1974]
572 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.2:558
the expenditure of appropriated funds, several authorities have ques-
tioned the Administration's position. Justice William Rehnquist has
concluded that executive authority to withhold appropriated funds
"is supported by neither reason nor precedent." 60 Rehnquist also has
expressed doubt that a constitutional theory might be formulated to
justify a presidential refusal to comply with a congressional directive
to spend.67 Moreover, a memorandum prepared for the 1971 con-
gressional hearings with regard to the impoundment controversy con-
cluded that Congress enjoys at least three methods of mandating the
expenditure of appropriated funds.68 And although the Supreme Court
has never expressly considered whether appropriations acts are dis-
cretionary or mandatory in nature, it has seemed to favor the latter
view in certain circumstances.6 9
Despite the expressed views of presidential defenders such as Ash
and Weinberger, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Adminis-
tration's best case for discretionary appropriations acts rests upon the
language of article I, section 9. Indeed, the Administration has relied
upon statutory construction, not constitutional analysis7 0 when arguing
its case before the courts. At oral argument in State Highway Commis-
sion v. Volpe counsel for the Government even observed: "I suppose
our brief comes as close as it can to conceding that were Congress to
make [spending] mandatory, that would be the end of the case."7'1
Similarly, Deputy Attorney General Sneed has suggested that Congress
may mandate full expenditure of appropriated funds, if it does so "in
unmistakably clear terms. '"7 2 And, under questioning, Secretary Wein-
66. Rehnquist, supra note 62, in 1973 Hearings 390, 393.
67. Id. at 394.
68. Ramsey, supra note 61, reprinted in 1971 Hearings 304. Ramsey argues that
Congress may mandate the expenditure of appropriated funds (1) by enacting a general
law that particular appropriations are to be expended "promptly," (2) by stipulating
that a certain amount appropriated for a specific purpose is to be available for that pur-
pose or (3) by enacting a program into law and requiring that it be implemented to
the extent of available appropriations.
69. See United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
70. The Administration has relied upon constitutional doctrine, however, in positing
its "executive power" argument, discussed at note 42 supra. See Massachusetts v. Wein-
berger, Civil Action No. 1308-73 (D.D.C. July 26, 1973), reprinted at 119 CONG. REC. S
15,044 (daily ed. July 30, 1973); Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (D.D.C.
1973), rev'd, No. 73-1835 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 1974).
71. 479 F.2d 1099, 1106 (8th Cir. 1973).
72. 1973 Hearings 367. Similarly, President Nixon himself has alluded to con-
gressional authority to mandate the expenditure of appropriations. In the course of
vetoing a Labor-HEW-OEO appropriations bill the President remarked that "nearly
nine-tenths of these [appropriations are] for mandatory programs which leave the
Executive Branch no discretion whatever either as to the level or the purpose of the
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berger tempered his previously quoted view with the qualification that
Congress does have authority to deprive a President of discretion to
withhold appropriations.7 3
It would also be incorrect, however, to conclude on the basis of
these remarks that the Administration has abandoned entirely one im-
portant line of its impoundment defense. Although the President's
spokesmen apparently now concede that Congress can write mandatory
appropriations acts, they have not conceded that Congress can in fact
force the President to spend. This seemingly anomalous position has
been aptly expressed by Mr. Sneed:
[W]hen we get down to ... situations in which all of the statutory
justifications for impounding [are] stripped away and we have simply
a question of whether there is any constitutional power on the part
of the President to impound and Congress has said you must spend,
it is our contention that he may refuse to spend and that the colli-
sion in that case . . . is a political question that is not justifiable[justiciable?] .74
In short, although Congress can tell the President he must spend, the
courts cannot require him to do so. 75
The continuing debate over the scope of presidential authority to
withhold appropriations serves only to obfuscate the more critical issue
raised by the impoundment practices of the Nixon Administration.
Even if one accepts the thesis that Congress cannot mandate the full
expenditure of appropriated funds, it does not thereby follow that the
President may exercise his spending discretion to cripple the legisla-
tive initiatives of Congress. Indeed, even those sources invoked by
the President as authority for the right to impound have recognized
the limited nature of discretion to withhold appropriations. To his
added expenditures." See Congressional Remedies for Impoundment of Funds, in 1973
Hearings 860, 862.
73. 1971 Hearings 137.
74. 1973 Hearings 383. For a general discussion of the justiciability issue see pp. 602-05
infra.
75. This is a curious argument. If Congress imposes a mandatory duty upon an
executive agency to release funds for a specific purpose, and if, as the Administration
seems to concede, Congress is constitutionally empowered to impose that duty, it would
seem that mandamus should lie to compel the performance of what amounts to a
ministerial act. Accord, Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686, 690
(D.S.D. 1973) (mandamus lies to compel consideration of applications for low interest
loans where Congress had not conferred discretionary authority on Secretary of Agricul-
ture to refuse such consideration). Sneed's argument reflects the Administration's hope
to shield impoundment from judicial review on the "political question" rationale-a
hope that the courts so far have frustrated, See discussion at pp. 600-06 infra.
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assertion that appropriations acts are nonmandatory,0 then-Senator
Truman added the qualification that funds must be spent "where need-
ed . . . to carry out some phase of the law.'"'7 7 President Roosevelt
emphasized that the reservation of funds "should not be used to set
aside or nullify the expressed will of Congress. '7 8 Similarly, the House
Appropriations Committee, referred to previously,9 indicated that
the President's right to withhold appropriations extends only to those
funds unnecessary to achieve a legislative objective.8 0
Valid policy considerations do support the view that Congress may
not mandate the full expenditure of appropriated funds. It is im-
possible to identify precisely the level of spending that will be re-
quired to effectuate particular legislation prior to its implementation.
Moreover, when a congressional goal can be achieved more efficiently
than originally projected, with concomitant financial savings, un-
necessary expenditures certainly should be reserved. The reservation of
such unnecessary funding is unquestionably a legitimate function of
the executive branch-a fact statutorily recognized by Congress8l and
established by years of precedent.8 2 But the dilemma raised by the
view that Congress cannot require the expenditure of appropriated
funds is its implicit sanction of presidential ability not merely to
minimize expenditures through efficient administration, but rather to
substitute presidential priorities for established congressional pre-
ferences83 If article I, section 9, were interpreted to preclude con-
gressional authority to mandate expenditures, Congress would be de-
prived of any institutionalized means of ensuring that its policies will
76. See note 57 supra.
77. 1971 Hearings 94, quoting from 89 CoNG. REc. 10,362 (1943).
78. Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 270 (1973), quoting from letter reproduced
in Supplemental National Defense Appropriation, 1944, Hearings on H.R. 3598 Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. 739 (1944).
79. See note 59 supra.
80. "The Administration officials responsible for administration of an activity ...
bear the final burden for rendering all necessary service with the smallest amount
possible within the ceiling figure fixed by Congress ...." 1971 Hearings 94 (testimony of
C.W. Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB), quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951) (emphasis added).
81. See Antideficiency Act of 1950, 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970), discussed at note 44
supra.
82. See authorities cited at note 13 supra.
83. Cf. 1973 Hearings 410-11 (remarks of Senator Muskie). Senator Muskie argued
that the Administration had used a grant of spending flexibility, intended to encourage
efficiency, to justify the impoundment of pollution control funds pursuant to Adminis-
tration economic policy. The House Appropriations Committee Report relied upon by
Secretary Weinberger, see note 80 supra, seemed also to recognize the danger that dis-
cretionary appropriations acts could be used by the executive branch to frustrate con-
gressional intention:
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be effected. Rather, the realization of statutorily enacted congressional
policy could well become dependent upon pragmatic political con-
siderations. '
IV. A CASE STUDY: IMPOUNDMENT OF WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL FUNDS
The President's impoundment of water pollution control funds,
after Congress had overridden his veto of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972,85 has prompted more litigation than
any other executive withholding of authorized funding. The extensive
judicial review of the President's action is representative of the ap-
proach to the impoundment controversy adopted by the courts.
Additionally, the judicial response to the impounding of pollution
control act funds provides some tentative answers to the question of
whether Congress can require the expenditure of appropriations.
A rudimentary knowledge of the statutory scheme prescribed by
the 1972 Amendments is necessary to understand the judicial disposi-
tion of suits brought to compel the release of pollution control funds.
Federal funds are provided through a two-phased process, sometimes
referred to as "contract authority."8 6 During the first phase, "allot-
ment," sums authorized for appropriation are divided proportionally
among the states.87 A state then must submit an application to the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA detailing how it will use its share of available
funds.8 The second phase occurs if and when those plans are approved.
The state then may contractually obligate its share of the authoriza-
tion, and federal funds ultimately are appropriated to liquidate those
obligations as they become payable. 89 While allotment is not tanta-
It is perfectly justifiable and proper for all possible economies to be effected
and savings to be made. But there is no warrant or justification for the thwarting
of a major policy of Congress by the impounding of funds ....
H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1951), excerpt reprinted in 1971 Hearings 153.
84. Furthermore, recognized authority to impound funds at will would enable a
President, should he be so inclined, to render efficient programming subservient to
political partisanship. The potential for political blackmail is obvious. Congressmen
critical of the President might find funds for federally assisted home district construction
projects impounded, until their criticism moderated; the flow of federal funding might
become as much a function of election year maneuvering as of careful, objective planning.
For concrete examples of such possible abuses, and for an enlightening discussion of the
political use of impoundment, see Pine, supra note 24, at 125-27.
85. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
86. See, e.g., City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033, 1037 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974), citing S. REP. No. 92, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
87. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 205, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
88. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 203, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
89. The statute includes specific criteria upon which the Administrator is to base
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mount to expenditure, it is clear that if authorized funds are not
allotted, the obligation or expenditure phase cannot occur. Thus, by
allotting only 5 billion of the 11 billion dollars authorized by Congress,
the President effectively impounded over half the available pollution
control funding.90
A. The Litigants' Positions: An Overview
Courts that have entertained suits challenging the withholding of
pollution control funds have focused their attention on the statutory
language and history of the 1972 Amendments. When the Supreme
Court considers the issue during its 1974 term, its inquiry is likely to
be similarly limited.91 On the basis of that language and history, both
plaintiffs92 and defendant (Administrator of the EPA)9s have con-
structed convincing yet diametrically opposed arguments. Central to
the positions of the respective parties is the specific language of sec-
tions 205 and 207 of the Amendments:
Section 205(a). [All] sums authorized to be appropriated pursuant
to section 207 for each fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972, shall
his decision to approve or disapprove a proposal. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§ 203-04, 86
Stat. 816 (1972). See also note 150 infra.
90. The Administration maintains that since allotment precedes appropriation, its
refusal to allot does not constitute an "impoundment." Therefore, unallotted water
pollution control funds have not been reported pursuant to the Federal Impoundment
and Information Act, Pub. L. No. 92-599, tit. IV, 86 Stat. 1324 (1972) (repealed 1974),
which requires a periodic listing of funds withheld by the executive. See also Note, Im-
poundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1505-06 n.2 (1973). Despite this fine semantic
distinction, a refusal to allot is the equivalent of an impoundment, since, if allotment
does not occur, states are precluded from incurring obligations which funds will be ap-
propriated to liquidate. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 203, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
91. See note 179 infra.
92. Among the various plaintiffs in suits seeking the release of pollution funds have
been states, see, e.g., Florida v. Train, No. Civ.-T.D.-73-156 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 74-1790, 5th Cir., April 3, 1974; Minnesota v. EPA, No. 4-73 Civ. 133
(D. Minn. June 25, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1446, 8th Cir., July 12, 1973; cities,
see, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), afj'd sub nom.
City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991
(1974); citizens' special interest groups, see, e.g., Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va. 1973), remanded with directions sub nom.
Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974); and a United States Congressman (who was denied standing), see
Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (1973). Throughout this note, "plaintiffs" is
used generically, referring to all those who have challenged the impounding of pollution
control funds.
93. Named defendants in the impoundment suits discussed herein generally have
been the successive administrators of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency: William Ruckelshaus, Robert Fri and Russell Train. The Nixon Administra-
tion, of course, has been the effective defendant in each case.
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be allotted by the Administrator not later than the January 1st im-
mediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which
authorized ....
Section 207. There is authorized to be appropriated ... for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, not to exceed $5,000,000,000, for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, not to exceed $6,000,000,000, and
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, not to exceed $7,000,000,-
000.94
In conference the bracketed word "all" was removed from section
205, while the phrases "not to exceed" were inserted in section 207.95
Upon these syntactical alterations the Administration premises its con-
tention that the Administrator of the EPA is not required to allot
among the states the full amounts authorized for each fiscal year.9
The Administration finds additional support for its position in con-
gressional debate that occurred prior to passage of the Amendments.
Of critical significance is Representative William Harsha's statement
that the statutory modifications were "intended to emphasize the Presi-
dent's flexibility to control the rate of spending." 97
Conversely, plaintiffs challenging the impoundment of pollution
funds argue that since the phrase "sums authorized . . . shall be al-
lotted" employs mandatory language, the Administrator lacks dis-
cretion to allot less than the full authorization for each year.98 Plaintiffs
94. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (emphasis added).
95. See 1971 Hearings 404 (statement of W.D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator).
The conference report did not suggest why these changes were made. Id.
96. See, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669, 677 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974). It again should be emphasized that the issue of whether all authorized
sums should be allotted is quite different from the question of whether all allotted sums
subsequently must be released or obligated. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text supra.
The latter question has not been before the courts.
97. 118 CONG. REC. H 9122 (daily ed. October 4, 1972). Congressman Harsha was
a member of the conference committee that finalized the language of the 1972 Amend-
ments and was House sponsor of the bill.
The Administration finds similar support for its position in then-Congressman
Ford's remark that "[t]he language [of the Amendments] is not a mandatory require-
ment for full obligation and expenditure up to the authorization figure in each of the
3 fiscal years." Brief for the Appellant at 14, Florida v. Train, appeal docketed, No. 74-
1790, 5th Cir., April 3, 1974, quoting from 118 CONG. REC. H 9123 (daily ed. October
4, 1972). The remarks of various other senators and congressmen, alluding to the Presi-
dent's ability to control expenditures pursuant to the Amendmepits, also are quoted
in support of the Administration's argument. See Brief for the Appellant, supra at 18-21.
See also 1973 Hearings 404-05 (statement of W.D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator).
98. See, e.g., City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033, 1039 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
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apparently concede that the Administrator may exercise discretion
to control the rate of spending at the second, or obligation, phase of
the appropriations process. 9" Like the Administration, those seeking
the release of funds invoke legislative debates concerning the Amend-
ments, and particularly the remarks of Representative Harsha, to
demonstrate that the EPA lacks authority to withhold any portion of
the sums available for allotment.100 Finally, plaintiffs contend that
when sections 205 and 207 are read in context with other portions of
the Amendments, the statutory scheme makes no sense if the allot-
ment of all authorized funding is not considered mandatory.101
Despite litigants' assertions to the contrary,102 the congressional in-
99. See Brief of Center for Governmental Responsibility as Amicus Curiae at 9,
Florida v. Train, No. Civ.-T.D.-73-156 (N.D. Fla. 1974). It remains unclear whether, at
the obligation phase, the Administrator may control the rate of expenditure only pur-
suant to the criteria enumerated in the Amendments, see Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 204, 86 Stat. 816, or whether extraneous
matters, such as the state of the economy, may be considered in determining the rate
at which funds are released for obligation. Still another unresolved question is whether
the Administrator is empowered to control only the rate at which funds are spent, or
whether he may control the ultimate level of obligated funding. Neither issue has been be-
fore the courts. One district court has implied that the Administrator is authorized to con-
trol the ultimate level of funding, see Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 267 n.13
(1973), although the District of Columbia Circuit apparently disagrees: "We find that it was
Congress' intention that the full $18 billion be spent to control water pollution." City
of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033, 1042 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991
(1974).
100. The thrust of plaintiffs' argument has been that the statement of Mr. Harsha
quoted by the defendant Administrator, see note 97 and accompanying text supra, was in-
tended to emphasize presidential authority to control funding at the expenditure, or
obligation, phase of the appropriation process, rather than at the initial allotment
phase. See, e.g., Brief of Center for Governmental Responsibility as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 99, at 9; Brief of Appellee at 24-29, Florida v. Train, appeal docketed, No. 74-1790
5th Cir., April 3, 1974. Also of particular significance to plaintiffs is Congressman
Harsha's characterization of the criteria enumerated in § 204 of the Amendments (ap-
proval of plan specifications, cost estimates, etc.) as "the pacing item in the expenditure
of funds." Brief of Appellee at 29, Florida v. Train, supra, quoting from 118 CoNG. REC.
H 10,268 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) (emphasis omitted). Those criteria become considera-
tions only after funds already are allotted, and requests for obligation of those funds
have been submitted by the states. A statement by Senator Muskie, Senate sponsor of
the Amendments, provides support for plaintiffs' position. Explaining the intent of the
bill, Muskie observed that " 'sums authorized to be obligated need not be committed
though they must be allocated.' " Brief of Center for Governmental Responsibility as
Amicus Curiae, supra at 10. But see Brief of Appellant at 15-16, Florida v. Train, supra
(criticizing Muskie's analysis).
101. See, e.g., Brief of Center for Governmental Responsibility as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 99, at 18-19.
102. The patent ambiguity of the statutory scheme is reflected in the fact that both
parties to the controversy can assert, not disingenuously, that the "plain meaning" of
the legislation supports their respective positions. Compare Brief of Center for Govern-
mental Responsibility as Amicus Curiae, supra note 99, at 7 ("when considered alone the
statute is plain in declaring that the Administrator shall allot the sums specified"), with
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tent reflected in the debates regarding sections 205 and 207 is
ambiguous at best. It is true that, taken literally, the remarks of
Congressman Harsha and others suggest that the Administrator is
authorized to control funding only at the expenditure, or obligation,
level of the appropriations process' 03-not at the allotment phase. On
the other hand, it is entirely conceivable that references to control of
"expenditure" were intended in a more generic sense; in the course of
debate the legislators might not have been consciously distinguishing
between allotment and expenditure. It might have been tacitly as-
sumed that control of allotments was simply one means of controlling
the ultimate rate of obligation; thus, if discretion to control the latter
clearly were established, reference to authority to control the former
was, perhaps, presumed unnecessary. The conscious removal of the
word "all" from the phrase "All sums ... shall be allotted" seems to
sustain the plausibility of this interpretation of congressional intention.
The syntactical alteration thus would suggest an intent to affect the
nature of the allotment section of the Amendments. 10 4
Looking beyond the narrow semantic inquiry, however, the pur-
pose and policy of the appropriation scheme prescribed by the Amend-
ments indicate that allotment of all authorized funds is indeed manda-
tory. The "contract authority" process105 was intended to eliminate the
inefficiency caused by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1956.106 These earlier amendments made allotment
contingent upon the amount of federal money actually appropriated
each year' 0 7 and therefore precluded long-range planning on the part
of the states. Future availability of federal pollution control funds
could not be predicted with certainty. s08 The allotment provisions of
the 1972 Amendments, however, designate the level of federal aid
that will be available for each of three succeeding years. The burden
Brief for the Appellant at 7, Florida v. Train, appeal docketed, No. 74-1790, 5th Cir.,
April 3. 1974 ("The [allotment] sections, by the plain meaning of their terms, confer
discretion on the Administrator.").
103. See note 100 supra and sources cited therein.
104. Cf. Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 269 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
105. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
106. The funding mechanism prescribed by the 1956 Amendments was virtually the
reverse of that prescribed by the 1972 Amendments. States were allotted their respective
shares of federal funds only after those funds actually were appropriated. See Act of
July 9, 1956, ch. 518, §§ 5(a)-(c), 70 Stat. 498. Although a specified sum was authorized
for appropriation each year Congress was of course not required to appropriate the
entirety of the allowable amount in any given year. Thus, the amount allotted was
contingent upon the amount actually appropriated each year and long-term state
planning was impossible.
107. See note 106 supra.
108. See Brief of the Center for Governmental Responsibility as Amicus Curiae,
supra note 99, at 17.
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of actually qualifying for that aid remains upon the states,10 9 but, since
the degree of federal assistance ultimately available is established, long-
term planning is facilitated.110
Thus, if the 1972 Amendments are read to confer administrative
discretion to withhold authorized funds from allotment, an important
objective of the statutory scheme-long-term planning-is frustrated.
The level of funding that Congress has determined will be available
for three succeeding years may not, in fact, be available. The states
would then be in no better position to plan for the future than they
were under the 1956 legislation. Logically, therefore, Congress seems
to have intended that the full amounts authorized be allotted for fiscal
years 1973, 1974 and 1975.111 Executive spending control could then
be exercised only as states attempt to obligate their previously allotted
portions of available federal funding."12
B. The Judicial Response
As the following discussion will demonstrate, courts that have
been called upon to resolve impoundment disputes have carefully
avoided the question of whether Congress is constitutionally authorized
109. Before a state may obligate its share of allotted funds, its plan must be ap-
proved by the Administrator and certain conditions precedent must be satisfied. See
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, §§ 203-04,
86 Stat. 816. See also note 150 infra.
110. It should be noted that the amount of federal funding available for use by
each state is predetermined by means of a specific formula. See Brief for Appellant, ap-
pendix, Florida v. Train, appeal docketed, No. 74-1790, 5th Cir., April 3, 1974. Therefore,
the amount of funding available, or impounded, on a national basis has a direct relation
to the amount available to each state.
111. It might be argued that the planning purposes of the Amendments are not
frustrated even if the President does refuse to allot some portion of authorized funding,
as long as he does make clear the reduced level of funding that will be available. There
are two considerations, however, that militate against this line of reasoning. First, Con-
gress in 1972 designated the level of funding that it intended to be available for fiscal
1973, 1974 and 1975. Shortly thereafter, of course, the President announced that only
a portion of that funding would be available for 1973 and 1974; it was not until 1974,
however, that the President announced that the authorized funding for 1975 also would
be reduced. See note 10 supra. Thus, a state that undertook a long-term construction
project in 1973, relying upon the availability of federal funds for 1975, might find that
the projected federal share will not be forthcoming. Secondly, Administration spokesmen
now suggest that the level of allotment initially designated by the President may not
in fact be final. Rather, the Administration's position now seems to be that it can in-
crease allotments when it deems the need to exist. See 1973 Hearings 840-41. Un-
fortunately, however, this in no way would facilitate state planning, since Administration
spokesmen also argue that factors other than existing need, such as the rate of infla-
tion, must figure in any decision to allot. See 1973 Hearings 416-17 (testimony of W.D.
Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator). Thus, federal funds might not be allotted even when
local need is demonstrated.
112. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra.
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to mandate spending; rather, those courts have based their decisions
on statutory interpretation. Nonetheless, the judicial response to im-
poundment in general, and to the withholding of water pollution con-
trol funds in particular, provides a framework for several tentative
conclusions regarding Congress' constitutional authority to require
the release of an entire appropriation or, more importantly, to dictate
the only bases on which appropriations may be withheld.113 Additional-
ly, the disposition of the pollution control act cases has reflected a
considerable difference of judicial opinion; this conflict among the
lower courts has prompted the Supreme Court to agree for the first
time to confront the impoundment controversy." 4 The litigation giving
rise to that conflict therefore will be examined in some detail.
(1) The District Courts
The district courts that have considered the Administration's re-
fusal to allot all authorized pollution control funding have confined
their attention to the language and history of the 1972 Amendments.
No court has considered the appropriations issue in constitutional
terms. In City of New York v. Ruckelshaus,115 Martin-Trigona v.
Ruckelshaus16 and Minnesota v. EPA 7 the respective courts concluded
that statutory language and history reflected Congress' intent to require
the allotment of all authorized funds.18 Similarly, the more recent
113. The latter inquiry is the more significant since, for obvious policy reasons,
see p. 574 supra, Congress only rarely has mandated the full expenditure of a particular
appropriation. See 1973 Hearings 367 (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
The central issue in the current impoundment controversy is whether the President
may withhold funding on the basis of policy considerations of his own, not enumerated
as conditions of or limitations on funding by the legislation in question. Thus the
critical question is whether Congress may dictate the only terms on which appropriated
funds may be withheld.
114. Several early Supreme Court cases, Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934); United
States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838),
occasionally have been cited as precedential authority on the impoundment issue. See,
e.g., 1973 Hearings 368 (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General). None of
those cases was decided within a political context as exists at present, involving policy
conflicts between the President and Congress.
115. 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), afJ'd sub noma. City of New York v. Train, 494
F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
116. No. 72 C 3044 (N.D. Ill. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1794, 7th Cir., Sept. 4,
1973, cited in Fisher, Court Cases on Impoundment of Funds: A Summary and Analysis
20, August 22, 1973 (Congressional Research Service).
117. No. 4-73 Civ. 133 (D. Minn. June 25, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1446, 8th
Cir., July 12, 1973.
118. In reaching their decisions, the courts relied primarily upon the amendments
to the language of §§ 205 and 207 of the Act, see notes 94-95 and accompanying text
supra, and the congressional commentary relating to those amendments. See, e.g., 358
F. Supp. at 676-79. Since Congressman Harsha had indicated that the thrust of the
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decisions in Texas v. Fri09 and Florida v. Train120 adopted the view
that allotment is a nondiscretionary duty imposed upon the Administra-
tor.1 2 , None of these courts reached the issue of whether all allotted
funds ultimately must be obligated. 22
Two other district courts viewed the 1972 Amendments different-
ly and, while reaching different conclusions, agreed that the Adminis-
amendments was to provide the Administrator with discretion to "control the rate of
spending," see note 97 and accompanying text supra, the respective courts concluded
that administrative discretion exists only at the obligation, or "spending," phase of the
appropriations process. Consequently, the allotment of authorized funding was deemed
mandatory. But see notes 103-04 and accompanying text supra.
119. Civil Action No. A-73-CA-38 (W.D. Tex. October 2, 1973), appeal docketed,
Nos. 73-3965, 73-4026, 5th Cir., Jan. 9, 1974.
120. No. Civ.-T.D.-73-156 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-1790,
5th Cir., April 3, 1974.
121. In a more conclusionary fashion, see, e.g., No. Civ.-T.D.-73-156, at 5-6, the
courts in Texas v. Fri and Florida v. Train interpreted the amendments to §§ 205 and
207 as did the district courts that already had considered the issue. See note 118 supra.
The court in Texas v. Fri, however, was additionally influenced by the unique "contract
authority" appropriations process established by the Water Pollution Control Act:
Congress chose the allotment procedure and contract authority so that state and
local governments would be able to effectively make long range plans in their
fight against water pollution. The feeling was that without unequivocal federal
financial commitment state and local governments would have difficulty entering
into long term contracts and financing long term bonds. It is illogical to think
that Congress would inject the same uncertainty back into the system it had
sought to avoid with the allotment procedure by giving the Administrator dis-
cretion to choose the amount to be made available to the state and local govern-
ments.
Civil Action No. A-73-CA-38, at 5. The structure of the Act, incorporating separate allot-
ment and obligation procedures, is probably the most persuasive evidence that Congress
intended the allotment of all authorized funding to be mandatory. See notes 105-12 and
accompanying text supra. As the court in Texas v. Fri recognized, if allotment is not
mandatory, its inclusion in the Act as a separate phase of the appropriations process
seems meaningless: planning will be futile if allotment is not mandatory. While other
courts have discussed the purpose of allotment, the point has been raised to substantiate
the conclusion that a particular suit was not hypothetical or premature. See, e.g., 358 F.
Supp. at 674. No other court has given the "contract authority" statutory scheme the
attention it seems to deserve in passing on the mandatory/discretionary allotment issue.
122. Several courts have indicated, however, that the Administrator is authorized
to use his discretion in actually obligating previously allotted funds. See, e.g., No. 4-73
Civ. 133, at 11; Civil Action No. A-73-CA-38, at 5. If those indications are correct, an-
other thorny question arises: Is the Administrator's discretion circumscribed by the factors
specifically enumerated in the 1972 Amendments, see note 150 infra, or is he authorized
to consider extraneous matters, notably the rate of inflation, in deciding what amount
of allotted funds to obligate? There is no unanimity of conjecture on this issue. Compare
Civil Action No. A-73-CA-38, at 5 ("The logical interpretation seems to be that Congress
intended to make a definite financial commitment to the state and local governments
while . . . giving the Administrator some discretion in the rate of spending to ease
inflationary pressures."), with No. 4-73 Civ. 133, at 11 ("[N]owhere in the statute does
Congress provide that the Administrator may consider matters such as the shape of the
national economy in carrying out this program.').
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trator is not required to allot all authorized funding. In Campaign
Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,2 3 Judge Merhige did find that
pollution control funds had been improperly withheld by the Ad-
ministrator. The rationale for his decision, however, bore little re-
semblance to the reasoning of the courts that have found in the legis-
lative history of the 1972 Amendments an intent that the full con-
gressional authorization be allotted. Judge Merhige observed that the
City of New York court had erred in ignoring the "syntactical his-
tory" of the Amendments. 12 4 Accordingly, he determined that Congress
did intend to delegate to the executive discretion to control the allot-
ment of authorized funds. 2-5 Nevertheless, Judge Merhige was par-
ticularly impressed by the substantial vote to override the President's
veto, 126 and was convinced that, in so voting, Congress had "re-
affirm[ed] the massive national commitment to environmental pro-
tection and [a] willingness to incur vast expenses in achieving that com-
mitment.' ' 12 7 He then concluded that, regardless of the apparent grant
of executive authority to withhold some pollution funds from allot-
ment, the impoundment of 55 percent of those funds constituted a
"violation of the spirit, intent and letter of the Act and a flagrant abuse
of executive discretion.' 2 8
Although the suit was dismissed for lack of standing, Judge Hauk
nonetheless reviewed the language and history of the 1972 Amend-
ments in Brown v. Ruckelshaus."9 Judge Hauk concluded that the
decisions of the other courts that had entertained pollution control
act suits were simply "not correct."' 30 He accepted as uncontroverted
123. 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va.), remanded with directions sub nom. Campaign
Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991
(1974).
124. id. at 698-99. Judge Merhige was referring to the "purposeful removal of the
word 'all' " from § 205 of the 1972 Amendments. See notes 94-95 and accompanying text
supra. In fact, the conference committee expressed no purpose for the removal of "all"
from § 205, although Congressman Harsha indicated on the floor of the House that
its removal was intended to emphasize the President's control over "the rate of spending."
118 CONG. REc. H 10,268 (daily ed. October 18, 1972).
125. 361 F. Supp. at 699.
126. Id. at 699-700. See also note 9 supra.
127. 361 F. Supp. at 700.
128. Id. The court in Minnesota v. EPA, No. 4-73 Civ. 133 (D. Minn. June 25,
1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1446, 8th Cir., July 12, 1973, also was influenced by the
magnitude of authorized funding withheld from allotment. Judge Lord observed that,
even if he had found administrative discretion to withhold some funding, "the refusal to
allot nearly half [sic] of the funds authorized for reasons not related to the Act . . .
marks a clear abuse of such discretion." Id. at 13-14.
129. 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See note 185 infra for a brief discussion
of Judge Hauk's dismissal of the suit for plaintiffs' lack of standing.
130. 364 F. Supp. at 269.
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the proposition that an appropriations act places only a ceiling on per-
missible expenditure of appropriated funds.' 13 From this premise, he
reasoned that an authorization to allot funds for future appropriation
similarly must be subject to discretionary executive action.1 32 Like
Judge Merhige in Campaign Clean Water, Judge Hauk was convinced
that the Amendments did delegate discretion to the Administrator to
withhold authorized funds from allotment. He apparently was not per-
suaded, however, that the withholding of 55 percent of those funds
constituted an abuse of discretion, since he did not even allude to
that issue.1 3
Although Judges Merhige and Hauk both premised their decisions
upon an interpretation of statutory language, their respective opinions
reflect the dilemma inherent in the view that Congress cannot coerce
the President to spend appropriated funds. Brown implicitly condones
the proposition that, where the President is not required to release
an appropriation in its entirety, he enjoys discretion to withhold as
much as he sees fit. Judge Hauk did not discuss possible congressional
action that could prevent the President from utilizing that discretion
to nullify duly approved legislation without a formal veto. Although
Judge Hauk maintained that his decision was based upon clear
statutory intent, 3 4 it is difficult to imagine how any statutory program
might be implemented as intended if 55 percent of its authorized
funding is withheld. One therefore hesitates to accept his conclusion
that the President's action was consistent with congressional inten-
tion.13 5 Rather, the Brown opinion seems to ignore the distinction be-
181. Id. But see notes 76-84 and accompanying text supra.
132. 364 F. Supp. at 269. Judge Hauk cited the Antideficiency Act of 1950 (ADA),
31 U.S.C. § 665, as congressional recognition of the proposition that "an appropriation
places an upper limit on spending, but not a floor." The express language of the ADA,
however, seems to grant the executive branch only a qualified right to withhold appropria-
tions in particular circumstances. See note 44 supra. Other courts that have passed on
the impoundment issue have been unwilling to accept Judge Hauk's broad reading of
the ADA. See State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1118 (8th Cir. 1973);
Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686, 696 (D.S.D. 1973).
13. Judge Hauk cited "one of Mr. Nixon's philosophical opposites," President
Franklin Roosevelt, for the proposition that appropriations acts are permissive in na-
ture. Judge Hauk failed to recognize, however, that his quoted authority raised the
very issue he ignored. Roosevelt had added that the reservation of appropriated funds
"should not be used to set aside or nullify the expressed will of Congress .... ." 364
F. Supp. at 270, quoting from Hearings on H.R. 3598 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 739 (1943). Judge Hauk did not attempt
to reconcile Roosevelt's qualifying language with President Nixon's impoundment of
more than half of a congressional authorization.
134. 364 F. Supp. at 266-67.
135. Judge Hauk's reasoning also is vitiated by the structure of the 1972 Amend-
ments. In answer to defendant's claim that plaintiffs' action was premature, Judge
Hauk noted at the outset of his opinion that the "financial scheme" (i.e., contract
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tween the legitimate exercise of executive discretion to effect valid
economies and the political exercise of that discretion to render
congressional policy subservient to presidential priorities. 36 Although
Brown turned on statutory construction, it illustrates the result to
which the view that Congress cannot mandate expenditure might lead:
a recognition of presidential authority to frustrate legislative initiatives.
At first glance, Campaign Clean Water might suggest that the
courts could prevent abuse of a recognized presidential authority to
withhold appropriations, but there is little in Judge Merhige's opinion
to sustain such a presumption. Even assuming, as Judge Merhige did,
that the withholding of appropriated funds at some point becomes a
deliberate obstruction of congressional intent, the difficulty of identify-
ing that point remains. Many observers might agree that the President
consciously frustrated the will of Congress by impounding 55 percent
of authorized pollution control funding. But what standards might
have guided Judge Merhige's decision had the impoundment not been
so substantial? Had the President withheld only 20 percent of
authorized funding the decision reached in Campaign Clean Water
would be more difficult to defend.13 7 The treatment of Campaign Clean
Water on appeal demonstrates the difficulty of applying the abuse-of-
discretion standard.
(2) The Circuit Courts of Appeals
In Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train3 8 the Fourth Circuit ap-
proved the district court's conclusion that the Administrator of the
EPA does enjoy discretion to refuse to allot all sums authorized for
appropriation by the 1972 Amendments.'39 After considering the issue
authority) was adopted by Congress "to facilitate long-range planning" on the part
of local governing units. 364 F. Supp. at 262. Long-range planning hardly can be
facilitated if, as Judge Hauk concluded, the Administrator is authorized to refuse to allot.
Allotment is essential to inform local governments of the level of federal aid that ulti-
mately will be available to assist implementation of their construction plans.
136. Cf. 1973 Hearings 411 (remarks of Senator Muskie).
137. Of course, Judge Hauk's conclusion that an appropriations act affixes only a
ceiling to executive spending discretion leaves the same question unresolved. If Con-
gress appropriated $90 billion for defense spending could the President legitimately spend
nothing? Could he spend as little as $25 billion?
138. 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
139. In fact, unlike other plaintiffs seeking the release of pollution control funds,
the plaintiff in Campaign Clean Water conceded that allotment pursuant to the
Amendments is a discretionary function. See 489 F.2d at 495. Instead, plaintiff urged
the Fourth Circuit to accept the district court's conclusion, see notes 126-28 and ac-
companying text supra, that the Administrator had abused his discretion by impound-
ing (i.e., withholding from allotment) 55% of authorized pollution control funding.
489 F.2d at 496. Defendant Administrator, on the other hand, reiterated his argument
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of whether that discretion had been abused,140 the court remanded the
case to the lower court with directions to establish a sufficient
evidentiary basis for its decision.1 4' Like the district court, the Fourth
that he enjoyed "absolute discretion in making such allotments, and that his exercise of
discretion [was] immune from judicial review." Id.
Although on appeal plaintiff acquiesced in the district court's holding that the
Amendments provide administrative discretion to withhold allotments, the Fourth
Circuit was not required to accept, nor should it have accepted, that determination.
The question of whether the Administrator is required to allot all authorized funds
clearly is not a question of fact, which the courts are not competent to review. See K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 30.03, at 548 (3d ed. 1972). Rather, it is a question
of law: it concerns the scope of legal responsibility imposed on the Administrator by an
act of Congress. Moreover, the district court treated the allotment issue as a question of
law, and reviewed statutory intent in reaching its decision. See 361 F. Supp. 697-99. Since
the Fourth Circuit did not criticize the district court's methodology, it tacitly approved
the lower court's conclusion that a question of law was at issue.
Nonetheless, instead of addressing the issue, the Fourth Circuit turned to another
accepted method of judicially approving an administrative agency decision: the court
suggested the existence of a "rational basis" to support the Administrator's judgment.
See note 143 and accompanying text infra. See also DAVIS, supra § 30.04, at 549-51. In so
doing the court failed to review the district court's interpretation of the legal duty
created by a federal law; certainly the litigants' agreement with the district court should
not have foreclosed such review, as the Fourth Circuit seemed to imply. See 489 F.2d at
497. Furthermore, in looking to the rational basis test to evaluate the propriety of the Ad-
ministrator's action, the court presumed an answer to the question it should have first con-
sidered. Put another way, by directing its attention to a variety of bases on which the
Administrator's actions might be sustained, see 489 F.2d at 499-501, the court ignored the
threshold legal question of whether the Administrator had been delegated authority to
refuse to allot all available funding in the first place. The Fourth Circuit's opinion seems
clearly at odds with the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement concerning the
proper scope of judicial review when administrative agency decisions are at issue:
The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the scope
of his authority. This determination naturally begins with a delineation of the
scope of the Secretary's authority and discretion.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971) (citations
omitted). Only after the reviewing court has made this initial determination should it
proceed to the question on which the Fourth Circuit focused: whether an administrative
decision was arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Id. at 416.
Of course an appellate court normally does not review sua sponte an issue not raised on
appeal. But where a case involves the proper interpretation of a federal statute having
a broad impact on the ability of local governments to allocate their scarce construction
revenues, the public interest would seem to compel a definitive resolution of a question
of law.
140. Before reaching the abuse-of-discretion issue, the court concluded that the
Administrator's exercise of that discretion was, in fact, amenable to judicial review.
489 F.2d at 497-99. The court noted that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1970), supported its refusal to adopt the " 'view that the [legislative] act of com-
mitting a matter to an agency's discretion forecloses court consideration of an alleged
abuse of that discretion.' " 489 F.2d at 498, quoting from Overseas Media Corp. v. Mc-
Namara, 385 F.2d 308, 316 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Finally, the court reasoned that a
question of whether an agency is exercising its asserted discretionary power "in a manner
consistent with the legislative purpose and ...the constitutional principle of separation
of powers," is reviewable and is not itself committed to agency discretion. Id.
141. 489 F.2d at 501.
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Circuit recognized that when the executive exercises discretionary ap-
propriation authority "in such a manner as to frustrate the Congression-
al purpose, either by absolute refusal to spend or by a withholding
of so substantial an amount of the appropriation as to make impossible
the attainment of the legislative goals," judicial intervention is ap-
propriate.1 4 2 But this observation only raises the same question that
the district court in Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus did
not adequately answer: When the executive concededly is not required
to release all appropriated funds, at what point does the impound-
ment of those funds controvert congressional intention? Put another
way, how can the executive be prevented from exercising such dis-
cretionary spending authority to substitute its policy priorities for
those of Congress? Perhaps the Fourth Circuit should be credited for
its willingness to at least approach this troublesome issue. Unfortunate-
ly, the court's opinion contributes little to a resolution of the issue,
and is an analytical disappointment with respect to its more specific
inquiry into executive spending discretion pursuant to the pollution
control amendments.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the fatal defect in the district
court opinion was that it had failed to consider the President's order
to allot only 55 percent of authorized pollution control funds "in con-
junction with the explanation given by the Administrator [of the EPA]
both in his presentation to this Court and in his Congressional ap-
pearances.' ' 4 3 The explanation to which the court referred related to
the existing need and capability of the states to spend, or obligate,
pollution control funds. 4 4 In premising its opinion on the district
court's failure to consider this sort of evidence, the Fourth Circuit
142. Id. at 498.
143. Id. at 499.
144. Specifically, the court was impressed by the Administrator's claim that there
had been "no denial of any qualified project in either fiscal year 1973 or fiscal year
1974." 489 F.2d at 500. The fact that plaintiff had not contradicted the Administrator's
declaration that "no qualified project for the Commonwealth of Virginia" had been
denied contract authorization also was persuasive to the court. Id. But as the text of
this note suggests, the existence of "qualified projects" should not be germane to the
question of whether all authorized pollution control funds should be allotted among
the states. Therefore the Administrator's assertions, as well as the plaintiff's failure to
contradict those assertions, should have been irrelevant. Similarly, the court should
have recognized that, with regard to allotment, additional considerations raised by the
Administrator were irrelevant: whether authorizations could be spent " 'in a wise or ex-
peditious manner' "; whether sufficient "technical capacity" then existed to carry on a
more extensive program; and the rate of inflation within the construction industry as
compared to the cost of living. Id. at 499-500. While these factors might be considered
by the Administrator in determining whether to obligate previously allotted funds,
but see note 122 supra, they should not be determinative of the appropriate amount of
allotment. See discussion pp. 588-89 infra.
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failed to make the critical distinction between the allotment and
obligation phases of the appropriations process. While the existing
capability of the states actually to utilize federal funds might be a
relevant consideration when the obligation of funds is at issue, 145 both
the purpose and structure of the 1972 Amendments indicate that such
considerations are extraneous to the question of whether authorized
funds have been allotted as Congress intended.
To reiterate, the expressed purpose of a "contract authority"
appropriations process, 146 with separate and distinct allotment and ob-
ligation procedures, is to facilitate long-term planning on the part of
the states. 47 Even accepting the proposition that allotment pursuant
to the 1972 Amendments is not mandatory, the planning objective of
the pre-obligation allotment procedure would be totally frustrated if,
before allotment occurs, states were required to demonstrate existing
capacity to utilize federal funds immediately. 48 The Fourth Circuit's
reasoning seems to reverse the statutory procedure: rather than require
the allotment of all available funds, based upon which the states
could then plan their sewer construction programs, the court apparent-
ly would require that the states plan and initiate construction projects
before the EPA even must allot-let alone obligate-federal funds
authorized for appropriation. Moreover, since the court willingly ac-
cepts the proposition that allotment is discretionary, should a state
actually proceed with construction in hope of demonstrating a need
for allotment, the Administrator presumably still could refuse to allot
on some alternative ground. 49 If the court's interpretation is correct,
it is questionable whether such a statutory scheme would create much
incentive for states to implement sewage treatment plans.
145. Even when he determines whether to obligate previously allotted funds, how-
ever, it is not clear that the Administrator may take into account extrinsic factors, such
as the rate of inflation, not specifically mentioned in the Amendments. See note 122 supra.
146. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
147. See notes 105-12 and accompanying text supra.
148. In addition to the paramount objective of facilitating long-term planning, the
legislative history of the 1972 Amendments reflects a congressional concern that federal
credibility be established with respect to the Government's commitment to pollution
control: " 'At a bare minimum the credibility of the existing federal commitment must
be re-established by backing words of authorization with monies of appropriation ....
A change in federal grant policy to establish a reliable commitment is vital ....... City
of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991
(1974), quoting from Hearings on Water Pollution Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 49, pt. 1 (1971).
Federal credibility is not likely to be enhanced if, before federal funds even are allotted,
the states must demonstrate existing need.
149. The court alluded to a variety of considerations, in addition to lack of existing
need, that might justify the Administrator's refusal to allot all authorized funds. See
note 144 supra.
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Aside from the Fourth Circuit's disinclination to consider the pur-
pose of the 1972 Amendments, the court can be faulted for its failure
to review the structure of the legislation in reaching its decision. One
obvious question not answered by the opinion is why, if the Adminis-
trator enjoys discretion to withhold allotments, the Amendments in-
clude separate sections enumerating factors that the Administrator
should consider in determining whether to obligate previously allotted
funds.150  The court suggests that the Administrator need only
demonstrate a sort of "rational basis" for his action in order to properly
refuse to allot.' 5' If the court is correct an enumeration of criteria to
guide the Administrator in controlling obligation seems superfluous.
Spending could more easily be controlled in the first instance, simply
by refusing to allot.152
Additionally, section 205 of the Amendments directs that sums
authorized for appropriation "shall be allotted. . . not later than the
January 1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year
150. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, §§ 203-04, 86 Stat. 816. Section 203 of the Amendments directs that in determining
whether to obligate previously allotted funds the Administrator should consider the
plans, specifications and estimated costs of a state's proposed projects. The Amendments
do not specifically delineate what constitutes a plan worthy of approval, which gives
rise to the unresolved issue of whether the Administrator may consider extraneous
matters, such as the rate of inflation, in approving state plans. See note 122 supra.
The approval of a plan under § 203(a) is the equivalent of obligation of the necessary
federal funds. Section 204 provides additional factors, in the form of "limitations and
conditions," which the Administrator is to consider before approving the obligation of
funding for any plan; for example, § 204(a)(5) requires that the size and capacity of
a project relate directly to need to be served by the project, including sufficient reserve ca-
pacity.
151. 489 F.2d at 501: "After all, there is a presumption of legality that attaches
ordinarily to an administrator's action and the burden of establishing impropriety
rests on him who challenges."
152. In defense of the Fourth Circuit one might argue that the statutory scheme
prescribed by the Amendments dictates that the Administrator consider the factors
enumerated in §§ 204-05, see note 150 supra, only after he determines, in his discretion,
what amount of available funding to allot. Thus it would not be superfluous to pre-
scribe a discretionary allotment process in addition to a discretionary obligation pro-
cedure: the latter might be viewed only as an additional "check" to ensure that funds
are not unwisely or unnecessarily obligated. But such an interpretation would be difficult
to sustain in the face of the emphatic view of Congressman Harsha, the floor manager
of the 1972 Amendments in the House, and a member of the conference committee that
finalized the language of that legislation. Harsha declared: "I would like to point out
that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency must approve plans,
specifications, and estimates. This is the pacing item in the expenditure of funds." 118
CONG. Rac. H 10,268 (daily ed. October 18, 1972). Section 203(a) of the Amendments
provides that the approval of plans, specifications and estimates occurs after funds have
already been allotted and states have submitted applications for federal aid based upon
those allotments. Since Congressman Harsha stipulated that approval of those applica-
tions would be "the pacing item," it is unlikely that Congress intended the allotment
process to be utilized to pace expenditures as well,
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for which authorized ..... 1 This language, on its face, appears to
reflect congressional intention that authorized sums shall be allotted
once yearly, before the respective fiscal years begin, and not, as the
Nixon Administration argues, as the need for allotments develops
throughout the year.15 4 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit was "strongly
persuaded" that section 205 provides only an initial date at which
sums then needed might be allotted, with additional allotments to
occur during the course of the fiscal year as the Administrator should
determine the need to exist.'5 5 Again, this construction seems incon-
sistent with the structure of the Amendments. No provision is made
for the disposition of sums not allotted by the first of January preced-
ing each successive fiscal year. Surely Congress would have devised some
procedure in the Amendments to handle authorized funds left un-
allotted if it had intended that portions of funds available for allot-
ment could be withheld. The existence of such a procedure relating
to funds allotted but unobligated reinforces this conclusion.1 5 6
The Campaign Clean Water opinion is open to criticism in still
other respects. What the court implies were conclusions of the Ad-
ministrator, justifying his withholding of allotments, actually were
the expressions of third parties not involved in the litigation.117 More-
153. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-500,
§ 205(a), 86 Stat. 816 (emphasis added).
154. In defense of its position, the Administration offers the following.
[W]hile a literal reading of [section 205] might suggest that no funds may be
allotted after the statutory time limits [i.e., after the January 1st preceding each
fiscal year], [we] do not believe that such a reading would be truly reflective of
Congressional intention. [We] interpret the . . .statutory language to mean that
the President's best judgment under circumstances prevailing at the time as to
the amounts that may be prudently allotted should be exercised by the statutory
time limits.
1973 Hearings 841.
155. The court offered no rationale for its inclination to interpret the statutory
directive that sums shall be allotted "not later than" January 1st to mean such sums
can indeed be allotted later than January Ist.
156. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 205(b)(1), 86 Stat. 816, provides: "Any amounts . . .allotted which are not obligated
by the end of [each] one-year period shall be immediately reallotted by the Administrator,
in accordance with regulations promulgated by him, generally on the basis of the ratio
used in making the last allotment of sums under this section."
157. The court misrepresented the testimony of the Administrator given before the
Senate ad hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds on February 6, 1973. The
court first noted that the Administrator's refusal to fully allot authorized funds was
based on his judgment that greater authorizations "could not be spent 'in a wise or
expeditious manner.' " 489 F.2d at 499 (footnote omitted). The court then continued:
This judgment was based, in turn, he [the Administrator] testified, on a conclusion
that "there was not sufficient technical capacity, technical capability, I think it
was, or contractual capacity" to carry out a greater or more extensive program.
In reaching that conclusion, he had taken note, according to his testimony, that
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over, the court's assertion that the Antideficiency Act 5s would
authorize the Administrator's action seems unsupportable on closer
examination.' 9 Finally, if the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit is ap-
proved by the Supreme Court during its 1974 term, and if any of the
tenuous justifications suggested by the court are held to be sufficient
to sustain the Administrator's action,1 60 the EPA would seem to enjoy
there were already available other contract authorizations for the same purposes
• . .which . . . meant that "there was $7.25 billion released on the 27th of
November [1973] to be spent over the next 18 months" in meeting the goals of
the program.
id. (footnotes omitted). The quoted passage above, referring to "technical capacity,"
was not the statement of the Administrator before the Subcommittee, but the statement
of Senator Chiles, paraphrasing what former White House counselor John Ehrlichman
"was reported" to have said. 1973 Hearings 416. Ehrlichman's attitude toward the
Amendments, and hence the value his interpretation should be accorded, is reflected
in the additional comment, not quoted by the court, that "you just can't correct pollu-
tion by pasting dollars on trees." Id. Moreover, Ehrlichman apparently was only repeating
the view of the President. See id. In short, what the court implied was the statement
of the Administrator was in reality the statement of Senator Chiles, who was paraphrasing
John Ehrlichman, who was paraphrasing the President. The court did attempt to main-
tain literal accuracy by referring to "a conclusion" rather than "his conclusion." The
following sentence, however, includes an obvious representation that the statement had
been made by the Administrator ("In reaching that conclusion, he had taken note .... 'I.
In fact, the Administrator admitted to the Subcommittee that he had not even seen
the statement to which Senator Chiles referred, 1973 Hearings 416, and which the
court attributed to him.
The Administrator's "judgment" that all authorized funds could not be spent "in a
wise or expeditious manner" was not, as the court stated, "based on" the passage quoted
above. The quotations placed in conjunction by the court were lifted from separate and
distinct portions of the Administrator's testimony. See 1973 Hearings 413, 416. Nor did
the Administrator "affirm," as the court stated, that his decision to withhold allotments
was "arrived at" on the basis of his determination that funds could not be spent wisely
or expeditiously. See 489 F.2d at 499. The court quoted the Administrator's "wise or
expeditious" language entirely out of context. The Administrator was not attempting
to justify his impoundment of pollution control funds; rather, he was offering a general
proposition: "As a proposition I think there may be some responsibilities that we have
been given by Congress in various areas for which funds are made available, for which
it appears that the funds simply can't be spent in a wise or expeditious manner and in
which Congress may agree with us." 1973 Hearings 413 (emphasis added). Few would
disagree with the Administrator's assertion when it is read in context. It is interesting,
however, that an appellate court should upbraid the court below for its failure to con-
sider what in reality are misattributed quotations and statements taken out of context.
158. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
159. 489 F.2d at 501. The court concluded that the ADA would empower the
Administrator to withhold funds from allotment " 'for reasons of efficiency and economy.' "
But the court ignored that provision of the ADA which directs OMB to recommend
the rescission of appropriations that it deems unnecessary. See 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2)
(1970). See also note 44 supra.
160. In remanding the case to the district court, the Fourth Circuit was careful
to add that it was not necessarily concluding that its many suggested rationalizations
for the Administrator's action were in fact valid; rather, the district court was to de-
termine whether those rationalizations were relevant "under a proper construction
of the discretionary power found to exist in th.e executive." 489 F.2d at 501 (footnote
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almost blanket authority to determine the level of pollution control
funding that will be allotted among the states.
In City of New York v. Train'61 the District of Columbia Circuit
reviewed the district court's decision in City of New York v. Ruckels-
haus. It was unnecessary for the appellate court to reach the issue of
whether the Administrator had abused his discretion pursuant to the
1972 Amendments; rather, the court agreed with the district court
that, at the allotment stage, the Administrator possesses no discretion
to abuse. The City conceded, and the court agreed, that the Amend-
ments authorize discretionary action at the obligation phase of the
appropriations process-that the Administrator may control the rate
at which previously allotted funds are obligated.162 But the court con-
cluded that the Administrator is required to allot among the states
all sums authorized for appropriation by Congress; 63 thus, the District
of Columbia Circuit refused to recognize discretionary authority that
the Fourth Circuit had affirmed. It is this conflict that the Supreme
Court has agreed to resolve.' 6 4
The District of Columbia Circuit undertook an exhaustive review
of the language and history of the 1972 Amendments in reaching its
decision. An extensive analysis of congressional intent was necessitated
by the interpretive methodology employed by the court. Unlike various
district courts,'65 the circuit court did not premise its opinion specifical-
ly on the language and congressional discussion of sections 205 and
207 (the allotment and authorization provisions). 6 6 Instead, the court
looked to the stated purposes of the 1972 Amendments in their en-
tirety and found that "it was Congress' intention that the full 18
omitted). Nonetheless, it is apparent from its opinion that the Fourth Circuit would
accept several, if not all, of the conceivable arguments in defense of the Administrator's
position. The existing need of the states for federal funds is, according to the court, "a
matter that might well be considered" in determining whether the Administrator had
exceeded his discretion. 489 F.2d at 500; see notes 143-49 and accompanying text supra.
Additionally, the court was "strongly persuaded" that the Administrator is not required
to allot all authorized funds by January 1st of each fiscal year. 489 F.2d at 501. In short,
the Fourth Circuit in Campaign Clean Water does significantly more than "suggest" what
factors the district court might consider on remand.
161. 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
162. Id. at 1043, 1044.
163. Id. at 1050.
164. This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court actually will reach the specific
issue on which the Fourth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit divided. It is con-
ceivable, though not likely, that the Court will resolve the issue on procedural grounds.
See pp. 598-607 infra.
165. Most district courts have directed their primary attention to the more narrow
issue of the language of § § 205 and 207, and to congressional debate specifically relating
to that language. See notes 115-33 and accompanying text supra.
166. Sections 205 and 207 of the Amendments are quoted at pp. 576-77 supra.
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billion dollars be spent to control water pollution."'16 7 Having made
that initial determination, the court proceeded to consider the allot-
ment issue on the premise that "if discretion in allotment would make
the achievement of this goal [i.e., the expenditure of $18 billion]
more difficult, it must be assumed that Congress intended no such
authorization."''l o Viewed within this framework, the court's rejection
of the Administrator's claim of discretion to withhold allotments
seemed a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the court's further analysis of
statutory language only confirmed what approached an initial assump-
tion that the spending objectives of the Amendments necessitate the
allotment of all authorized funds.
18 9
From an analytical viewpoint, the City of New York opinion pro-
vides a coherent and sensible reading of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments. The court does not entirely avoid the need to con-
sider, if not divine, the intent reflected in the unexplained alterations
in statutory language; 170 the opinion does, however, minimize the in-
fluence of arguably contradictory assertions of legislators by looking to
the philosophy and objectives of the Amendments for primary
guidance. Given the ambiguity and complexity' 7' of the statutory
language, this was the court's only realistic alternative.
But the court's reading of legislative objectives, on which it based
the conclusion that allotment is mandatory, is not beyond question.
While there is support for the court's finding that Congress intended
to spend a full 18 billion dollars to combat pollution' 7 2 several con-
167. 494 F.2d at 1042 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 1042-46.
170. The court noted that there was "no precise explanation" for the removal of
the word "all" before the phrase "sums authorized . . . shall be allotted" in § 205(a).
494 F.2d at 1043. Congressman Harsha stated that this semantic change was intended
to "emphasize" the President's control over the rate of spending. 118 CONG. REC. H 10,268
(daily ed. October 18, 1972). It has been suggested that Harsha's use of the word "em-
phasize" reflects his intent not to make a substantive change in the legislation, i.e., not to
confer discretion (over allotments) where none originally had been conferred. See Brief of
Appellee at 29, Florida v. Train, appeal docketed, No. 74-1790, 5th Cir., April 3, 1974. On
the other hand, at least two courts have concluded that the elimination of the word
"all" was intended to substantively alter § 205, and to provide the Administrator with
discretionary authority over allotments. See Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
361 F. Supp. 689, 698-99 (E.D. Va.), remanded with directions sub nor. Campaign
Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991
(1974); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 269 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
171. 494 F.2d at 1039: "Initially, it is to be noted that a 'plain meaning' analysis
will not suffice here." See also note 102 and accompanying text supra.
172. E.g., " 'The [House-Senate conference committee] agreed in the end that a
total of $18 billion had to be committed by the Federal Government . ..during fiscal
years 1973-75.' " 494 F.2d at 1040, quoting from 118 CONG. RE. S 16,870-71 (daily ed.
October 4, 1972) (emphasis added by court). See also sources quoted in 494 F.2d at 1040-
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gressmen appeared unwilling to accept that conclusion. Almost im-
mediately after stating that Congressman Harsha "clearly intended to
obligate the entire $18 billion,"'73 the court quotes several remarks
which seem to indicate that Harsha, the House sponsor of the bill, en-
tertained no such intention.174 At another point the court seems to
contradict, or at least limit, its own finding that Congress intended to
spend the authorized funds in their entirety: "We express no opinion
as to whether or to what extent the Administrator could legally with-
hold funds at the obligation stage . . . ."1 In short, while the court
was on firm theoretical ground in depending upon congressional
spending objectives to guide its construction of the Amendments, it is
not clear that the court's interpretation of those objectives was correct.
Rather than premise its analysis on the questionable presumption
that Congress intended full expenditure of all authorized funding, the
circuit court might have relied primarily upon the unique structure
of the 1972 Amendments in reaching its decision. Ironically, the court
at the very outset of its opinion sets forth the most plausible basis for
its conclusion that allotment is intended to be a mandatory function:
The Act revised the procedures for funding federal aid to local
governments for the purpose of the construction of sewage treat-
ment plants. Prior to the Act's passage, these expenditures were first
authorized and then specifically funded by the normal Congressional
appropriation process. Due to the nature of this process, local
42. Several of the passages from congressional debate relied upon by the court, however,
are somewhat suspect because of their rhetorical nature. E.g., "The question is not, 'Can
we afford to spend $18 billion over the next three years for waste treatment plants?' but
'can we afford not to?' " Id. at 1042, quoting from 118 CONG. REc. H 10,268-69 (daily
ed. October 18, 1972) (emphasis added by court).
173. 494 F.2d at 1044.
174.
"Mr. Gerald R. Ford.
"As I understand the comments of [Mr. Harsha] the inclusion of the words
in section 207 in three instances of 'not to exceed' indicates that it is a limita-
tion. More importantly that it is not a mandatory requirement that in 1 year
.. . there would be $5 billion and the next year . . . $6 billion and a third
year . . .$7 billion [i.e., $18 billion] obligation or expenditure?
"Mr. Harsha.
"I do not see how reasonable minds could come to any other conclusion. [than]
that the language means we can obligate or expend up to that sum-anything up
to that sum but not to exceed that amount."
494 F.2d at 1044, quoting from 118 CON. REc. H 9123 (daily ed. October 18, 1972) (em-
phasis added by court).
175. 494 F.2d at 1049 n.36. The court perhaps intended some distinction between
its use of the term "obligation" here, as opposed to its earlier finding that the full $18
billion "be spent." See pp. 592-93 supra. But there is no meaningful difference between the
terms: once funds are obligated they effectively are "spent."
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governmental recipients could not ascertain the exact amount they
would receive until after the formal appropriation. As a result,
local governments were hesitant to enter construction contracts with
only a hope that federal monies would be ultimately passed to them.
The Act was passed to insure that ultimate grantees could rely in
advance on the amounts available.17 6
If Congress deviated from the "normal appropriation process" in order
to implement a procedure that would encourage and permit local
planning, it is only logical to interpret that procedure in a manner
that will in fact facilitate planning. And since discretionary allotment
of authorized funds would inhibit, if not frustrate, local planning,
allotment properly should be considered mandatory-a ministerial
duty imposed upon the Administrator.177 Curiously, after raising this
issue, the City of New York court does not again allude to it. In a
sense, then, the court looked to the wrong congressional objective for
support. The court should have looked to Congress' intent in structur-
ing the Amendments as it did, rather than intent with respect to the
ultimate level of spending authorized by the legislation. Of course, the
court would have reached the identical conclusion, but its rationale
would have seemed more defensible.
C. Summary
The foregoing discussion has emphasized the point that the "con-
tract authority" framework of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments makes no sense if the Administrator of the EPA is
authorized at the allotment stage to impound funds designated for
appropriation by Congress. Most district courts, as well as the District
of Columbia Circuit, have concluded that full allotment is mandatory.
But those courts have devoted their attention to the language and
history of the 1972 Amendments to the Act. Because of the ambiguities
in and complexity of that language and history, it would be more ap-
propriate for the Supreme Court to focus on the planning objectives
behind the contract authority scheme when it considers the issue this
term. If the legislative intent evinced by that scheme is accorded the
significance it deserves, the duty to allot all authorized funds should
be deemed mandatory.
This review of court decisions concerning impoundment of pollu-
tion control funds was preceded by a general discussion of whether
Congress is constitutionally empowered to mandate expenditure of
176. 494 F.2d at 1056.37.
177. See notes 105-12 and accompanying text supra.
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appropriations. This issue has not been addressed by any court that
has considered the impoundment of pollution control funds, or by any
court that has reviewed impoundments in other areas.'78 Nor is it likely
that any court will confront the issue, in view of the judiciary's disin-
clination to consider a constitutional question when alternative de-
cisional grounds-such as statutory interpretation-are available.
1
'
7 9
But even if Congress cannot mandate expenditure, the courts' efforts
to divine legislative intent when impoundment is at issue suggest that
Congress can limit executive spending discretion so strictly that the
President often will have little choice but to spend. 8 0 Judicial inter-
vention will be available to require the observation of those limits.
Perhaps the courts have recognized the "informal veto" potential s'
of an unreviewable executive power to withhold authorized funding.
More importantly, however, by resolving impoundment disputes
through statutory rather than constitutional interpretation, the courts
have avoided "political question" obstacles to review of an issue infused
with separation of powers overtones. Thus, the most critical element of
the Administration's effort to establish uncontested impoundment
authority also has been rejected.
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
In defending its impoundment practices before the courts, the Ad-
ministration has steadfastly maintained that a presidential decision to
impound appropriated funds raises a nonjusticiable "political ques-
178. But see State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1122 (8th Cir. 1973)
(Stephenson, J., dissenting).
179. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of.").
180. At least one court in a pollution control act decision concluded that the Presi-
dent may withhold funds only pursuant to the criteria established by Congress. See
Minnesota v. EPA, No. 4-73 Civ. 133, at 11 (D. Minn. June 25, 1973), appeal docketed, No.
73-1446, 8th Cir., July 12, 1973 ("[N]owhere in the statute does Congress provide
that the Administrator may consider matters such as the shape of the national economy
in carrying out this program."). Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g.,
State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1109 (8th Cir. 1973), stating:
[A]lthough a general appropriation act may be viewed as not providing a
specific mandate to expend all of the funds appropriated, this does not a
fortiori endow the Secretary with the authority to use unfettered discretion as
to when and how the monies may be used. The Act circumscribes that discretion
and only an analysis of the statute itself can dictate the latitude of the ques-
tioned discretion.
(Citations omitted.) See also Fisher, Court Cases on Impoundment of Funds: A Summary
and Analysis 49-54, August 22, 1973 (Congressional Research Service).
181. See note 65 supra.
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tion' 182 and that a suit instituted to secure the release of those funds
is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity."18 The respective
defendant-EPA Administrators also have challenged the standing of
various plaintiffs seeking the allotment of pollution control act
funds;11 only once has that challenge been sustained, however, and
the court's reasoning in that instance was not entirely convincing. 85
182. See, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669, 673 (D.D.C. 1973),
afI'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct.
1991 (1974); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689, 692 (E.D.
Va.), remanded with directions sub nom. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489
F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974). See also 1973 Hearings 379,
388 (testimony of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
183. 361 F. Supp. at 694; 358 F. Supp. at 673.
184. See, e.g., 361 F. Supp. at 692-93.
185. In Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D. Cal. 1973), Judge Hank con-
cluded that neither Congressman George E. Brown, Jr. (on behalf of himself and all
other California citizens and residents), nor the City of Los Angeles, had shown "that
any act of the President or the EPA [had] hurt, is injuring, or will impair" the activities
of either of them. Id. at 264. He correctly noted that in all the previous suits brought
to compel the allotment of funds pursuant to the 1972 Amendments, plaintiffs had sub-
mitted affidavits documenting the imminent injury they would sustain if relief were not
granted. See, e.g., Minnesota v. EPA, No. 4-73 Civ. 133 (D. Minn. June 25, 1973), appeal
docketed, No. 73-1446, 8th Cir., July 12, 1973. Judge Hauk reasoned that without such
affidavits neither plaintiff had "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that 'concrete adverseness which ripens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends ....... 364 F. Supp. at 264, quoting
from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
In reaching his decision to dismiss, however, Judge Hauk failed to consider both
the nature of the relief sought by plaintiffs, and the intent of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972. As did the Fourth Circuit in Campaign Clean
Water, Inc. v. Train, see notes 144-45 and accompanying text supra, Judge Hauk ignored
the specific reason for Congress' enactment of a "contract authority" appropriation
process, with separate allotment and obligation phases. See notes 105-12 and accompany-
ing text supra. Plaintiffs seeking only the allotment of authorized funds, as were the
plaintiffs in Brown, should not be required to allege that "proposals have been rejected
because of frozen funds," as Judge Hauk concluded. See 364 F. Supp. at 264. Rather,
the only requirement for standing should be an allegation that the Administrator's
failure to allot is disrupting the local government's ability to formulate long-term
plans for the construction of sewage treatment facilities. Such an allegation should
satisfy the test for standing announced by the United States Supreme Court in Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The plaintiff has
been caused "injury in fact, economic or otherwise," id. at 152, since the plaintiff has
been denied the present opportunity to allocate efficiently its scarce revenues in prepara-
tion for construction projects. Moreover, "the interest sought to be protected" in suits
challenging the impoundment of pollution control act allotments "is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected . . . by the statute . . . in question." Id. at 153.
The "contract authority" procedure is expressly designed to sustain the local interest
in long-term planning; that specific interest is thwarted when allotments are withheld
at the Administrator's pleasure. In sum, the Brown court should have approached the
standing issue in a more liberal and farsighted fashion. While the court might have
required an affadavit from the City of Los Angeles claiming that its ability to plan
sewage construction projects had been impaired, the court should not have required a
showing that actual proposals had been rejected because of frozen funds. The latter
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The Administration's persistence in raising these jurisdictional ob-
jections implies that it is perhaps less confident of its legal position
than President Nixon's broad declaration of an "absolutely clear"
constitutional right to impound would suggest.18 Rather, it appears
that a critical element in the Administration's efforts to establish a
recognized right to impound is the necessity to insulate the assertion
of that right from judicial consideration. This analysis of the Adminis-
tration's position is apparently confirmed by the remarks of Deputy
Attorney General Sneed to the effect that, even if alleged statutory
justifications for impoundment 187 were repealed by Congress, leaving
only the Constitution for authority, presidential impoundment still
would transcend judicial review as a nonjusticiable political "colli-
sion" between the executive and legislative branches of government. 8 8
A definite advantage would accrue to the Administration should the
courts accept Sneed's contention: the impoundment controversy then
would be resolved on the political battlefield. And, with the President
on the side of "budget trimming," American voters would be likely
to view his position as the more palatable one. 8 9 The courts, however,
have been largely unimpressed by the Administration's claim that
jurisdictional obstacles bar the judiciary from entertaining suits
challenging the impoundment of funds.
A. Sovereign Immunity
The Administration cites two United States Supreme Court de-
cisions, Land v. Dollar9" and Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp.,9 1
in support of its argument that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
bars plaintiffs from initiating suits challenging impoundment in the
federal courts. Land established the principle that "if the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or inter-
fere with the public administration . . . the suit is one against the
allegation might have been necessary if plaintiffs were challenging the Administrator's
failure to obligate previously allotted funds. But, realistically, no meaningful proposals
can be formulated unless funds are first allotted, and it is that dilemma upon which
the court should have focused in considering the standing issue.
186. See note 41 supra.
187. For a brief discussion of the statutes that allegedly confer impoundment au-
thority on the President, see notes 44-48 supra.
188. See quotation at note 74 supra.
189. The President seemed to recognize the political advantage of his position, and
implied that those who disfavor impoundment must favor the raising of taxes. See 1973
Hearings 240 (excerpts from the President's press conference of January 31, 1973). Secre-
tary of Agriculture Butz also attempted to suggest that Senator Muskie's criticism of
impoundment necessarily establishes his support of increased taxes. Id. at 537-38.
190. 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
191. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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sovereign, ' '1 92 and therefore must be dismissed. In Larson the Court
dismissed a suit brought by a private corporation against the War
Assets Administration, concluding that a suit challenges the sovereign
if the effect of the judgment would be "to restrain the Government
from acting, or to compel it to act."'195 Larson, however, could just as
easily be invoked to sanction the filing of an impoundment suit, as
the Court also reasoned that, should a plaintiff allege that a govern-
ment official has acted either unconstitutionally or beyond the scope
of his statutory authority, the suit need not be dismissed.194 Impound-
ment suits commonly have included allegations that a particular execu-
tive official or administrator has acted beyond his statutory discretion
in withholding appropriated funds.1 95
Moreover, the judgment sought by a plaintiff challenging the im-
poundment of appropriated funds would not "expend itself on" public
revenues-the monies sought already have been authorized for appro-
priation by Congress. The judgment sought by plaintiffs seeking the
full allotment of authorized pollution control funding certainly is not
vulnerable to the sovereign immunity argument: since allotment is
not the equivalent of expenditure, the treasury is in no way affected
by the former procedure. 9 6 Finally, plaintiffs in impoundment suits
do not seek to compel the government to act; the government already
has acted in authorizing expenditures under the various statutes that
have been at issue. 9 7 The courts therefore have encountered little
difficulty in recognizing the frailty of the Administration's sovereign
immunity defense. 98
192. 330 U.S. at 738.
193. 337 U.S. at 704.
194. Id. at 689-90.
195. See, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669, 673 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S.
Ct. 1991 (1974); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1973). The same
allegation has been common in impoundment suits not dealing with the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act. See, e.g., Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp.
60, 68 (D.D.C. 1973) (Administration's termination of, and impoundment of funds for,
certain Office of Economic Opportunity operations).
196. Accord, Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
197. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1111-12 (8th Cir.
1973) (impoundment of Federal-Aid Highway Act funds).
198. Additionally, plaintiffs in many impoundment cases have sought review of
administrative action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 US.C.
§ § 701-06 (1970). District of Columbia courts recognize another exception to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity when jurisdiction is based partially on the APA, see Scanwell
Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and plaintiffs who have
instituted suit in Washington, D.C., to ensure jurisdiction over various executive agency
heads have benefitted from that exception. See, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus,
358 F. Supp. 669, 673 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494
F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
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B. Political Question
In defense of its impoundment practices, the Administration has
invoked two elements of the "political question" doctrine as articu-
lated by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr.1 9 First, the Administration
has urged that the grant of "executive power" in article II, section 1, of
the Constitution 20 0 comes "very close" to a "textually demonstrable
commitment" of spending authority to the President.201 Secondly, it is
argued that no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"
are available for determining whether particular expenditures of
federal funds are appropriate.2 0 2 The former assertion clearly is open
to question. If the President is empowered to control federal spending
by virtue of article II, section 1, it is only through an extremely
generous reading of that clause, hardly amounting to a "textually
demonstrable commitment." Arguably, the control of federal spending
is more "demonstrably committed" to Congress by virtue of article I,
section 7,203 and where the executive branch has infringed upon legis-
lative prerogatives, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer " suggests
that judicial intervention is available. 0 5 Moreover, even when a
specific duty or responsibility has been demonstrably committed to a
199. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In delineating the possible bases of a political question,
Justice Brennan remarked:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
200. U.S. CONsr. art. H, § 1: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America."
201. See, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669, 675 (D.D.C 1973),
afj'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.
204. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
205. The court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube carefully circumscribed the article II
powers of the President. The controversy that prompted the litigation arose when
President Truman seized the nation's steel mills to prevent a strike which he believed
would jeopardize the national defense. The President maintained that the "aggregate"
of his powers under article II justified his actions, 343 U.S. at 587, but Justice Black,
speaking for the Court, found this reasoning unpersuasive. Justice Black first observed
that the President's constitutional function in the lawmaking process is limited "to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad," id., and
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particular governmental branch, Powell v. McCormack2 6 indicates that
the judiciary may determine whether an action of that branch exceeds
the responsibility committed to it.
20°
While the separation of powers principle certainly is infused with
political overtones, it does not follow that the courts therefore should
shrink from their responsibility to preserve the vitality of that doctrine.
When political resolution of an intragovernmental dispute is not
realistic, it is essential that the courts fulfill their duty to maintain the
independence of the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment. Several courts that have entertained suits challenging the im-
poundment of pollution control funds have acknowledged this unique
judicial burden. 20 Those courts have placed principal reliance on the
District of Columbia Circuit's recent observation: "In our overall
pattern of government the judicial branch has the function of requiring
then concluded that the President's seizure order amounted to an attempt to make law,
in contravention of the Constitution. Id. at 588.
The Court's willingness to adjudicate the respective bounds of executive and legisla-
tive power in Youngstown Sheet & Tube seems to constitute ample precedent for judicial
intervention in the impoundment controversy; the underlying issue-the power to "make
law"-is strikingly similar. The Nixon Administration has dismissed the relevance of the
Youngstown Sheet & Tube precedent, however, on the basis of the remedy available
to the Court in that situation. While the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube simply
could strike down the presidential seizure order, "[i]t [is] quite another thing for
[a court] to undertake to direct the President with respect to how and in what manner...
he would spend appropriations." 1973 Hearings 401 (testimony of J.T. Sneed, Deputy
Attorney General). But courts that have heard impoundment cases have avoided this
alleged obstacle to judicial review by turning to specific statutory language for guidance.
See note 215 and accompanying text infra. No court has attempted to "supervise" the
President.
206. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
207. In Powell the Supreme Court determined that the House of Representatives'
expulsion of the late Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was not insulated from judicial
review by the "political question" doctrine. Quoting from Baker v. Carr, Chief Justice
Warren remarked:
"[D]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitu-
tion to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch ex-
ceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in con-
stitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate inter-
preter of the Constitution."
395 U.S. at 521, quoting from 369 U.S. at 211. One commentator suggests that Powell
reflects the Court's intent to interpret "carefully and narrowly" any purported
"textual commitment." See Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HAiv. L. Riv. 1505, 1531
(1973).
208. See, e.g., City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669, 676 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689, 696 (E.D.
Va.), remanded with directions sub nom. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d
492 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
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the executive (or administrative) branch to stay within the limits
prescribed by the legislative branch.' ' 20 9
Serious implications arise from the Administration's claim of un-
reviewable article II impoundment authority. Presidential responsibili-
ty to control federal spending, were it effectively sanctioned through
judicial abstention from impoundment disputes, could preclude Con-
gress from establishing national priorities through the appropriations
process, and from exercising the authority expressly conferred by
article I, section 7.210 Moreover, the unique nature of the impoundment
issue seems to dictate the courts' refusal to embrace the Administra-
tion's "demonstrable commitment" argument. A court rightfully ab-
stains from judicial review on political question grounds when the
matter in controversy can be resolved more appropriately and effective-
ly through the competitive political process. Reference to the most
notorious recent issue designated "political" by the courts-the legali-
ty of the Vietnam War 211-illustrates this point. Aside from other factors
militating against judicial intervention in that dispute,212 Congress
was adequately equipped, had it so desired, to challenge the Presi-
dent's war policies through its control of the budget. When the issue
209. National Automatic Laundry v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, which provides, in part:
The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States . . .
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To raise and support Armies...
To provide and maintain a Navy ....
211. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 33 (lst Cir. 1971), stating: "As
to the power to conduct undeclared hostilities . . . we are inclined to believe that the
Constitution . . . committed the matter to both branches, whose joint concord precludes
the judiciary from measuring a specific executive action against any specific clause in
isolation." The court did indicate, however, that "[s]hould either branch be opposed
to the continuance of hostilities," it might be inclined to a different view. Id. at 34.
Were the latter situation to eventuate, the issue would be similar to that raised by
executive impoundment: whether one branch had encroached upon the other's con-
stitutional responsibilities. See notes 208-09 and accompanying text supra.
212. Litigation concerning the Vietnam War seemed to constitute a classic example
of a "political question," since, in addition to the two elements of the political ques-
tion doctrine discussed above, the issue arguably involved "an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; judicial review might have expressed a
"lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government"; there was a potential
for "embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question"; there was, in the view of many, "an unusual need for unquestioning ad.
herence to a political decision already made." Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186, 217
(1962). On the other hand, none of these additional "political" factors seem to have
a significant bearing on the impoundment dispute. See Comment, Presidential Impound-
ing of Funds: The Judicial Response, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 328, 344 n.83 (1973).
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is executive withholding of appropriated funds, however, the Presi-
dent has seized control of the very weapon-the "power of the purse"-
that provides Congress with its competitive coequality.218 This dis-
tinguishing characteristic of the impoundment issue should influence
the judiciary to intervene in the conflict.
The second "political factor" that the Administration finds in-
herent in impoundment disputes-an absence of "judicially discover-
able and manageable standards" sufficient to direct the expenditure
of appropriated funds-has been rejected by the courts with virtual
unanimity. 14 Statutory language, legislative history and declarations
of congressional policy generally have enabled the courts to ascertain
sufficient "standards" to resolve the narrow question raised by im-
poundment cases: whether a particular statute or act grants the exec-
utive discretion to withhold funding thereunder. 215 The courts, there-
fore, have not been called upon to assess the manner in which the
executive branch has conducted itself; rather, they have been com-
pelled to decide only whether a statute provides administrative dis-
cretion or imposes a ministerial duty.2 16 Plainly, there is no absence
213. One commentator has summarized the alternatives available to Congress in
battling the President over impoundment, and has found those alternatives unaccept-
able:
An attempt by Congress to impeach the president might create a constitutional
crisis more grave than the present one. If Congress cut off funds for the opera-
tion of the executive branch, government services would be impaired and the na-
tional interest injured. Congress could refuse to enact programs devised by the
president until the impounded funds were spent, but such action might result
in the delay of urgently needed programs. Finally, Congress could attempt to
pass a bill specifically commanding the expenditure of already appropriated funds.
But such a bill would, of course, be subject to veto, and, therefore, a two-thirds
vote of each house would be necessary to compel executive compliance with an
appropriation previously enacted into law.
Comment, supra note 212, at 345 (footnotes omitted).
214. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1111 (8th Cir. 1973)
(impoundment of Federal-Aid Highway Act funds); Government Employees Local 2677
v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 67-68 (D.D.C. 1973) (impoundment of funds for, and dis-
mantlement of, Office of Economic Opportunity); Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp.
1363 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, No. 73-1835 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 1974) (im-
poundment of funds for, and refusal to implement certain provisions of, Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968). But see Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654
(N.D. Cal. 1972) (impoundment of funds appropriated by amendment to Housing Act
of 1937; action dismissed, inter alia, as political question because of lack of "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards').
215. See, e.g., 479 F.2d at 1111 ("The fundamental issue is whether the Secretary
possesses . . . authority to exercise contract controls for the reasons advanced here. Such
authority, if it exists at all, must be gleaned from the language of the Act itself."); 358
F. Supp. at 68 ("[P]laintiffs claim that the defendant . . . is in violation of his duties
- . . [to implement the Economic Opportunity Act]. No nonjusticiable political question
is presented in this case.").
216. In State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), the court
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of "manageable standards" for determination of whether the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 require the allotment
of all authorized funding. Resolution of this issue necessitates only
declaratory or injunctive relief: a determination by the court that
the Amendments either do or do not compel allotment, which in
turn is determined by the language and history of the statute it-
self.217
Even if the duty to allot is deemed discretionary-as the courts
in Campaign Clean Water concluded 218-review of administrative ac-
tion should not be precluded for lack of "judicially discoverable and
manageable" standards. Rather, a court then should invoke settled
principles of administrative law and inquire into the permissible
scope of that discretion. Section 701 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)219 does make unreviewable (but not on "political question"
grounds) agency action "committed to agency discretion." The Ad-
ministrator of EPA has claimed that his exercise of discretion over
allotment of funds is therefore unreviewable.220 But the Supreme Court
has indicated that section 701 is a "very narrow exception" to the
general rule of reviewability, and is limited to those "rare instances"
in which a statute is so broadly drawn that there is no " 'law to
apply.' "221 The 1972 Amendments do not seem to meet this strict
concluded that the Secretary of Transportation's impoundment of funds appropriated
pursuant to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-36 (1970), as amended,
23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-44 (Supp. 1974), necessitated not an examination of whether the
Secretary had abused his discretion, but only an inquiry into "whether [he had] been
delegated any discretion to so act in the first place." 479 F.2d at 1107. In Massachusetts
v. Weinberger, Civil Action No. 1308-73 (D.D.C. July 26, 1973), reprinted at 119 CONG.
REC. S 15,044 (daily ed. July 30, 1973), the court refused to dismiss as raising a political
question plaintiff's claim that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had acted
illegally in refusing to release funds appropriated pursuant to the National Defense Edu-
cation Act, 72 Stat. 1488, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 441-45 (1970). "[T]he issue presented,"
reasoned the court, "is not how defendants should exercise discretion granted them
under the statute . . . but rather whether Congress has granted them unlimited dis-
cretion .... " 119 CONG. REC. at 15,045.
217. See, e.g., Florida v. Train, No. Civ.-T.D.-73-156, at 4-5 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 1974),
appeal docketed, No. 74-1790, 5th Cir., April 3, 1974 ("The Court perceives the
issue not to be the power of the executive in spending vis a vis the Congress but to be
whether Congress intended that the funds in question must be allotted to the
States .... "); City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669, 675 (D.D.C. 1973),
afj'd sub nom. City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974). ("[T]he Court is being asked by plaintiff to require the Administrator
to perform what it alleges to be a purely ministerial duty under the Act, that of allotting
... the sums authorized to be appropriated in Section 207 of the Act.').
218. See notes 125 & 139 and accompanying text supra.
219. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
220. See, e.g., Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1991 (1974).
221. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
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standard.2 22 Moreover, the APA certainly was not intended to commit
to agency discretion the question of whether that agency is acting con-
sistently with congressional intention;2 2 3 such a delegation, perhaps in
itself unconstitutional, would preclude any meaningful oversight of ad-
ministrative activity.2 24 Therefore, judicial review of the Administra-
tor's refusal to allot pollution control funds should remain available,
even if a court reaches the conclusion 2 5 that allotment is not manda-
tory.
It is important to distinguish, however, between unreviewable ac-
tion "committed to agency discretion" and a political question that is
unreviewable for lack of "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards." When the former issue arises, the threshold determination
should be whether the legislature intended to commit a particular
function to agency discretion;2 26 with regard to the latter issue, a
court need only decide whether it is equipped with sufficient specialized
knowledge or expertise to resolve the particular problem. The dis-
tinction is a fine one, and easy to misunderstand, as one court did
in an early impoundment decision.2 27 But the distinction is impor-
222. See, e.g., the explicit criteria for guiding administrative discretion in Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§ 203, 204, 86
Stat. 816. See also note 150 supra.
223. Accord, 489 F.2d at 498.
224. Cf. K. DAVIS, ADMINMsTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 28.05, at 516 (3d ed. 1972): "[W]hen-
ever a court . . .holds [that action is committed to agency discretion], a party who
thinks that discretion has been abused is denied meaningful judicial check. The natural
tendency of courts to cut off review in these circumstances may sometimes mean that
injustice remains uncorrected."
225. See notes 105-12 and accompanying text supra, arguing that allotment should
be considered mandatory.
226. According to Professor Davis, this is the common practice. See DAVIS, supra
note 224, § 28.05, at 515. In the absence of clear legislative intent, Davis suggests that
the courts themselves determine what issues are appropriate for judicial review. This
latter determination, of course, would be essentially the same as the political question
inquiry: the court would be required to consider its own capability to review esoteric
or highly technical fact issues. See DAvis, supra § 28.05, at 515-18. However, the legisla-
tive intent of the Water Pollution Control Act, with its emphasis on facilitation of long-
term planning, belies any suggestion of an intent to commit funding thereunder to
unreviewable agency discretion. See notes 105-12 and accompanying text supra.
227. Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Plaintiffs
challenged the Department's refusal to release $150 million for various urban renewal
projects authorized by Pub. L. No. 91-609, amending Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-35 (1970). In a somewhat curious opinion, the court determined that since
full expenditure of the funds was not mandatory, and, since there was no indication of
the level of funding that Congress did intend to require, the case raised a nonjusticiable
political question (lack of "judicially discoverable standards"). See 340 F. Supp. at 656-
57. While the court's reading of the statute probably was correct, the decision itself seems
shortsighted. The court did not suggest that spending in this instance was unreviewable
as action "committed to agency discretion" under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
Therefore, the court should have directed HUD to set forth reasons justifying its with-
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tant. The "committed to agency discretion" exception should occur
only rarely; if sufficient standards are not available for a court to
evaluate agency action, the court should remand the case and require
the agency to provide support for the action it has taken. 228 With this
procedure available, it is unnecessary for a court simply to dismiss a
challenge to agency action for lack of "discoverable standards" for
resolving the issue. Invocation of the political question doctrine in the
same situation to foreclose review would not encourage administrative
agencies to act responsibly or as intended, since a judicial check on
agency action would be unavailable. Moreover, frequent "political
question" abstention would encourage Congress to draw strictly cir-
cumscribed delegations of agency authority which, while facilitatingjudicial review, might frustrate administrative flexibility and economic
efficiency.2 29
To summarize, the courts so far have agreed that executive im-
poundment of appropriated funds presents an issue of statutory con-
struction, and that, when confronted with an impoundment suit, in-
quiry into the constitutional dimensions of presidential and legislative
spending authority is unnecessary.230 This statutory construction ap-
proach to the controversy has enabled the courts to avoid grappling
with issues truly "political" in the constitutional sense. Justice
Brennan emphasized in Baker v. Carr that he was advocating judicial
abstention from political questions, not political cases: "The courts
cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether
some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority.231
Of course, politics and intragovernmental conflict play a continuing
role in the impoundment controversy, but the issue as presented to
the courts has not as yet satisfied any of the traditional political ques-
tion criteria.
holding of funds, as did the court in Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492(4th Cir. 1973). See note 141 and accompanying text supra. This is also the procedure
recommended by DAvis, supra note 224, § 2.08, at 45. To rule, as did the Housing
Authority court, that the litigation raised an unreviewable political question is to fore-
close all future judicial scrutiny of the Department's action. Arguably, then, the De-
partment could refuse to spend any of the authorized $150 million and escape judicial
discipline. In essence, the Housing Authority rationale leaves Congress with two unpalat-
able alternatives: to draw a statute so narrowly that the exercise of administrative
flexibility is precluded or to allow the President, with judicial review unavailable, to
"veto" legislation through impoundment. See note 213 supra.
228. Cf. DAvis, supra note 224, § 2.08, at 45; Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Con-
nally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
229. Moreover, strictly drawn delineations of agency authority would contravene
the intent and spirit of the Antideficiency Act. See note 44 supra.
230. Several courts have, however, considered tangentially the constitutional impli-
cations of impoundment. See note 43 supra.
231. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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The commentators have been proven incorrect in their prognoses
that the impoundment issue would never reach the courts;
23 2 their
conjectures have been corroborated, however, to the extent that no
court has passed on the legality of impoundment per se. The Ad-
ministration therefore can continue to withhold appropriated funds,
rightfully maintaining that impoundment has not been declared un-
constitutional or even generally impermissible.2 3  But the statutory
context in which the courts have viewed impoundment disputes indi-
cates that the Administration's hopes of keeping the issue entirely
unresolved, through the political question barrier, are not likely to
be realized.
23 4
VI. CONCLUSION: THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Although executive impoundment of appropriated funds appears
only to raise the question of whether Congress is empowered to re-
quire the President to release federal revenues, the judiciary has
framed the issue differently. The question that the courts have
answered is not whether Congress can force the President to spend,
but whether it can so limit executive spending discretion as to ensure
232. See, e.g., Church, Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of Con-
gressional Control Over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1240, 1252 (1970); Miller,
Presidential Power To Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional De-
cision-Making, 43 N.C.L. REV. 502, 533 (1965).
233. While the Nixon Administration has suggested that it will impound appropriated
funds less frequently, the President has made clear his intent to continue his refusal
to allot pollution control funds, still claiming that this is not "impoundment." See
notes 10 & 90 supra. Semantics may be immaterial, however, after the Supreme Court
rules on the issue during its 1974 term.
234. In City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 1991 (1974), the Administration did not even appeal the "political question"
issue. Perhaps that argument has been abandoned in the face of growing judicial im-
patience-particularly in the District of Columbia where many impoundment suits
are initiated:
It is time this litany [political question] was displaced by a modicum of common
sense. When Congress directs that money be spent and the President . . . declines
to permit the spending, the resulting conflict is not political. The President . . .
believes he has the power . . . to refuse to spend at his discretion. Yet he is
charged by the Constitution faithfully to execute the laws. If the President is in
all good faith mistaken as to the meaning and effect of the law ... what is more
normal and consistent with our American system of government than for the
courts to interpret the law and thus resolve the apparent conflict ...
To say that the Constitution forecloses judicial scrutiny in these circum-
stances is to urge that the Executive alone can decide what is best .... These cases
should move to higher courts for prompt, definitive determination shorn of the
confusing inconsequential defenses so typical of Government legalese these days.
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v, Weinberger, 361 F. Supp.
897, 900-01 (D.D.C. 1975).
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that presidential priorities will not be substituted for congressional
initiatives.235 Thus, the determinative question recurring throughout
impoundment litigation has been, "Is the executive branch in com-
pliance with the terms of the legislation at issue?" In the overwhelming
majority of instances the answer has been in the negative. 236 The
courts have approached impoundment disputes in this manner be-
cause the legislation in question generally has not reflected an intent
to mandate full expenditure;23 7 moreover, this approach has enabled
the courts to avoid a thorny constitutional issue involving two coequal
branches of government.
Even though no court has specifically held that Congress may
require the expenditure of funds, a critical element of the im-
poundment controversy at least tentatively has been resolved.
Central to that controversy is the issue of whether, given the discre-
tionary nature of most appropriations acts,238 the President may con-
sider factors other than those intended by Congress in determining
the amount of federal funding to be released. Among these other
factors, on which the Administration has defended its impoundment
practices, have been the rate of inflation, ' 3  program "effectiveness"
in the Administration's view240 and the President's own budget
policies.2 41 With virtual unanimity the courts have agreed that such
considerations do not justify executive impoundment; only Congress
235. E.g., "It is not within the discretion of the Executive to refuse to execute
laws passed by Congress but with which the Executive presently disagrees." Pennsylvania
v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, No. 73-1835
(D.C. Cir. July 19, 1974) (circuit court found President had acted consistently with
congressional intention).
236. As of late 1973, the Library of Congress noted, the "box score" of court
rulings on impoundment stood at thirty-eight to two, against the Administration's posi-
tion. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., October 22, 1973, at 8.
237. Rather, the legislation at issue usually has conferred spending discretion; the
legal question has been whether the executive can consider factors other than the
specific terms of a particular statute or act in determining the level of funding to be
released. See note 180 supra; notes 238-42 and accompanying text infra.
238. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings 367 (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
239. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1115 (8th Cir.
1973) (impoundment of Federal-Aid Highway Act funds) ("[imt is apparent that the
Secretary does not have the authority to withhold funds for anti-inflationary purposes.");
Oklahoma v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 724, 728 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
240. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd,
No. 73-1835 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 1974) (suspension of several Housing Act programs
which, in view of President, had "failed").
241. See, e.g., Government Employees Local 2677 v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 73
(D.D.C. 1973) ("The defendant contends that because the budget message of the Presi-
dent . . . requests no funds for OEO to operate after June 30, 1973, the fiscally respon-
sible course ... is to phase out the [Community Action Agency] program .... ).
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may prescribe the conditions on which funds will be released or with-
held.242
Of course, the water pollution control act cases dealt only with
the issue of whether the Administrator of the EPA is required to allot
all authorized funds, and not whether those funds, once allotted, must
be spent or obligated. It therefore might be argued that the courts'
statutory interpretation approach to the allotment question might not
have been deemed appropriate had the actual expenditure of funds
been at issue. But other courts have looked to statutory intent in
reaching decisions that effectively will require the expenditure of
funds.2 43 The courts have found no independent executive authority,
apart from that granted by the specific terms of a particular statute, to
control the release of congressionally authorized appropriations. This
is the most significant lesson to be drawn from the judicial inclination
to resolve impoundment disputes by reviewing legislative intention.
When the Nixon Administration impounded the entire ten mil-
lion dollar appropriation authorized for the construction of a National
Aquarium, Casper Weinberger explained that the President had
"given Congress another opportunity to consider the relative im-
portance of the fish. '" 2 4 4 No scholarly analysis should be required to
substantiate the conclusion that the President lacks constitutional au-
thority to give Congress "another opportunity" to consider legislation
that he has not vetoed. But Weinberger went even further and offered
the proposition that, when the President terminates a program through
the withholding of funds, only he can determine whether he has
properly exercised his executive responsibility.242 The recent round of
242. See, e.g., Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686, 694 (D.S.D.
1973) ("The Administrator's discretion is limited to the determination of qualifica-
tions."); Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1371-72 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 73-1835 (D.C. Cir. July 19, 1974) ("The Secretary has the discretion to
accept or refuse approval of particular applications in accordance with statutory and
regulatory criteria.'); Pealo v. FHA, 361 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973) (Secretary's
discretion limited by terms of the statute). Moreover, even when a court has indicated
that consideration of such factors as inflation might be appropriate in establishing the
level of federal spending, that conclusion was deemed consistent with congressional
intent. See Texas v. Fri, Civil Action No. A-73-CA-38, at 5 (W.D. Tex. October 2, 1973),
appeal docketed, Nos. 73-3965, 73-4026, 5th Cir., Jan. 9, 1974 ("The logical interpretation
seems to be that Congress intended to make a definite financial commitment . . . while
... giving the Administrator some discretion in the rate of spending to ease inflationary
pressures.").
243. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 239-42 supra. Again, it should be emphasized
that no court literally has directed the executive to spend money. But a reading
of the cited authorities makes clear that once the congressionally established conditions
precedent are satisfied by potential recipients of federal funds, the executive has no
choice but to spend.
244. 1971 Hearings 140.
245. Id. at 138.
1974)
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impoundment decisions, however, has repudiated this assertion of un-
reviewable executive authority. The courts have indicated that Con-
gress is the only branch of government authorized to condition the
expenditure of appropriated funds, and that the judiciary will ensure
that only Congress' conditions are imposed. The approach to impound-
ment adopted by the courts will more effectively foster the realization
of legislative objectives than would judicial recognition of congression-
al authority to mandate expenditure. Few would support the wisdom
or expediency of a demand that the President spend the entirety of
all appropriations. Much more important, therefore, is the recognition
of Congress' ability to provide executive spending discretion and, at
the same time, to ensure that only those factors Congress deems relevant
will influence spending decisions.
A recent attempt to deal with impoundment legislatively reflects
the wise policy of providing executive spending discretion to promote
administrative flexibility and efficiency, while retaining sufficient con-
gressional control to ensure that delegated discretion is not abused. Al-
though the Nixon Administration had steadfastly opposed enactment
of any comprehensive anti-impoundment legislation, 246 in July the
President signed into law the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974.247 If the Act is implemented as intended, and is
complied with by the President, the need for continued case-by-case
resolution of impoundment disputes could be measurably reduced.
At the outset, the Act eliminates what the Administration has
characterized as the "most explicit" congressional sanction of impound-
ment:248 the statutory authorization, provided by the ADA, to with-
hold funding in the face of "other developments" occurring after an
appropriations bill is enacted.249 Reserves may now be established
"solely to provide for contingencies or to effect savings" made possible
by changed requirements or more efficient operations. 250 This amend-
ment should preclude impoundment for such reasons as a program's
failure, in the Administration's opinion, to satisfy its objectives-a
failure described in the past as an "other development" justifying
impoundment.2 51
The Impoundment Control Act also resolves the problem of de-
246. An earlier attempt to curtail impoundment legislatively was characterized as
"wholly impractical, profoundly unwise, and of very doubtful constitutionality." 1973
Hearings 369 (statement of J.T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
247. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
248. See note 44 supra.
249. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
250. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1002, amending 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
251. 1973 Hearings 287 (testimony of R.L. Ash, Director-designate, OMB).
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fining or specifying what constitutes an "impoundment" 252 by looking
to the intent of a presidential withholding of funds. Two alternatives
are provided. If the President determines that all or any part of avail-
able "budget authority" 53 will be unnecessary to achieve the objectives
of a statutory program, or that fiscal considerations dictate that some
portion of that budget authority be withheld, he must recommend
that Congress rescind appropriation of the unneeded or unwanted
amount. 5 4 On the other hand, if the President intends only to "de-
fer '' 2 5 the release of budget authority-that is, to slow the rate at which
it is made available-he must transmit a special message informing
Congress of his intent.2 58 The choice between recommending rescission
and proposing deferral is significant. If the President chooses the form-
er course, his recommendation is denied unless both Houses of Con-
gress approve it within 45 days;225 if Congress fails to act, all budget
authority must be made available.2 58 If he chooses the latter alternative,
the President's proposal is rejected only if either House disapproves
at any time after the special message is transmitted.2 5 9 Obviously, the
President bears a heavier burden in seeking approval of a recommended
rescission. The apparent logic of the statutory scheme, however, is
compelling. Rescission of all or a substantial portion of budget
authority for a particular program often will be no different from
program termination. It should be more difficult for the President
effectively to terminate a program than merely to retard its implemen-
tation through deferral.
2 10
252. See note 4 supra.
253. Budget authority is defined as "authority provided by law to enter into obliga-
tions which will result in immediate or future outlays involving Government funds."
H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(2) (1974).
254. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1012(a) (1974).
255. "Deferral" is broadly defined as "withholding or delaying the obligation or
expenditure of budget authority," or "any other type of Executive action or inaction
which effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority
H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1011(l)-(A)-(B) (1974).
The latter part of this definition seems on its face to reach executive action such as
the refusal to allot Water Pollution Control Act authorizations. Therefore, in the future,
the Administration's hesitancy to characterize the withholding of allotments as "im-
poundment," see note 90 supra, should be immaterial. At the same time, this new
definition will have no bearing on the Supreme Court's resolution of the current Water
Pollution Control Act impoundment dispute. See note 268 infra.
256. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1013(a) (1974).
257. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1012(b) (1974).
258. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1012(b) (1974).
259. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1013(b) (1974).
260. It should be noted that a deferral may continue only for the duration of the
fiscal year during which it is initiated. See H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1013(a)
(1974). Therefore, the President cannot circumvent the Act by indefinitely deferring
budget authority instead of proposing rescission.
1974]
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Additional provisions included in the Act seem calculated to en-
sure effective congressional oversight of executive funding decisions.
The President must specify reasons for his proposed actions and, to
the extent practicable, must estimate the likely fiscal, economic and
budgetary effects of a pending rescission or deferral. 26 1 The Comp-
troller General is required to inform Congress if the President uni-
laterally rescinds or defers budget authority. 62 Moreover, the Comp-
troller General must report his conclusion to Congress if he finds that
the President has classified as a deferral a spending decision that
should be considered a rescission, or vice versa.2 6 3 Finally, the Comp-
troller General is authorized to initiate judicial proceedings if an
executive agency fails to release budget authority after a recommended
rescission has been rejected or a proposed deferral disapproved.2"4
It would be premature, however, to conclude that the Impound-
ment Control Act will eliminate the possibility of future withholdings
of appropriated funds. A cryptic disclaimer preceding the substantive
portion of the Act declares that "[n]othing contained in this Act .. .
shall be construed as . . . asserting or conceding the constitutional
powers or limitations of either the Congress or the President ....
No explanation of this disclaimer is provided by the "explanatory
statement" accompanying the conference report of the bill,2" but its
inclusion in the law may represent the price paid for the President's
signature. As noted above, 28 7 an important element of the Administra-
tion's impoundment defense arises from an interpretation of the Con-
stitution, notably an interpretation of the article II powers of the
President. Therefore, regardless of the strictures imposed by the new
Act, a President might in some instances continue to impound, citing
his constitutional responsibilities-which, of course, cannot be negated
by an act of Congress.
Most importantly the new Act is designed to encourage adminis-
trative flexibility and efficiency, while ensuring that executive spending
discretion will not be used to frustrate congressional policy. The Act
may not entirely preclude presidential impoundment, and it will have
no bearing on the legal resolution of the Water Pollution Control Act
controversy. 28 Nonetheless, if a President complies with the terms of
261. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1012(a)(3)-(5), 1013(a)(4)-(6) (1974).
262. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1015(a) (1974).
263. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1015(b) (1974).
264. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1016 (1974).
265. H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1001(1) (1974).
266. See S. REP. No. 93-924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
267. See note 42 supra.
268. The disclaimer to the Act also declares that no part of it shall be construed as
(2) ratifying or approving any impoundment heretofore or hereafter executed
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the Act, and if the Comptroller General fulfills his enforcement
responsibilities, the oppressive costs of duplicative impoundment liti-
gation could be considerably reduced. Furthermore, the Act could
lead to an improved planning and operational capability on the part
of local governments, since the future availability of federal revenues
hopefully will become more predictable. And finally, the ability of the
executive branch to reorder congressional priorities will be substantial-
ly foreclosed.
THOMAS T. ALSPACH
or approved by the President ...
(3) affecting in any way the claims or defenses of any party to litigation con-
cerning any impoundment; or
(4) superseding any provision of law which requires the obligation of budget
authority or the making of outlays thereunder.
H.R. 7130, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1001(2)-(4) (1974). It therefore appears that the with-
holding of funds authorized for appropriation pursuant to the Water Pollution Control
Act remains a live controversy for the Supreme Court to resolve this term.
